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ABSTRACT 
There are those who have stated that James' social phi-
losophy is of little import, and that the reader of James 
is, therefore, hard-pressed to find any notion of community 
therein. My primary purpose in this work is to show that 
while James has no systematic "theory of community," he 
does have important things to say about our "experience of 
community." In showing this, I also indirectly respond to 
the claim made against James' social philosophy. 
I call attention to the importance of James' theory of 
relations--where both conjunctive and disjunctive relations 
are held to be as real as the terms they connect--to his 
position as regards both the self, and the relation of 
selves known as the community. This is also the basis for 
James' suggestion that on the common sense level of daily 
life, we operate within the framework of a narrative con-
cept of selfhood. 
Our experience of community consists of three overlap-
ping areas: the material, social, and spiritual. In the 
first area, our focus is upon "me and mine." In the second, 
it is on our social relations. The third has to do with the 
moral relations that exist between ourselves and other mem-
bers. I suggest that a hypothetical Jamesean community is 
one that is pragmatic in orientation. James characterizes 




JAMESEAN RELATIONS VERSUS HUMEAN RELATIONS 
We can investigate the concept of community without 
ever referring to human beings at all, but we can not 
explore any community without first giving an account of 
relations. 
The immense popularity and influence which James' The 
Principles of Psychology has enjoyed from its initial pub-
lication to the present day, has understandably fostered 
the belief that James came to philosophy through the por-
tals of experimental psychology. Nevertheless, it is 
British empiricism which constitutes the ·most important 
influence in this regard, and it is Hume's treatment of 
relations in particular that serves as the target against 
which a great deal of James' mature philosophy is directed. 
James' thoughts on the community also reflect this concern. 
Accordingly, I begin with Hume. 
That which comes before the mind, that of which the 
mind is aware, are perceptions. 1 Perceptions are of two 
sorts: impressions and ideas, both of which can be either 
simple or complex. Impressions comprise "our sensations, 
passions and emotions, 112 but it is the intensity with which 
1 
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 2d ed., ed., 
P . H. Nidditch (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1978), p. 1 
2 
Ibid. , p. 1 
1 
they "str ike upon the mind" 3 or force their way into con-
sciousness, which is their most defining characteristic. 
Impressions can then be divided into "those of Sensation 
and those of Reflextion."
4 
Impressions of sensation are 
simply the product of the five senses, but to a great 
extent impressions of reflection, which comprise our pas-
sions and emotions, require the prior mediation of either 
one or more impressions of sensation, or one or more cor-
d . . d 5 respon ing 1 eas. 
Of course thought does not merely consist of simple 
impressions and simple ideas; rather, it is the comple x 
forms of these mental phenomena which form the greater part 
of the content of consciousness, along with whatever one's 
current emotional state may be. Impressions cause ideas, 
and simple ideas exactly copy simple impressions. 6 This 
basic process works much the same way regarding complex 
impressions and their corresponding complex ideas, though 
with one important difference: 
I perceive, therefore, that tho' there is in general a 
great resemblance betwixt our complex impressions and 
ideas, yet the rule is not universally true, that they 
are exact copies of each other.7 
The degree of resemblance between seeing the color red, and 
after closing our eyes, thinking of the color of red is 
3 Hume, Treatise, 1 p. 
4 Ibid., 7 p. 
5 Ibid. , 275-6 pp. 
6 Ibid . , 4-5 pp. 
7 Ibid . , p. 3 
2 
quite high. To perform this ex p e rim e nt wi th e v e n a mod-
erately detail e d painting though, produc e s r es u lts o f a 
much lower order. And it is not only me mory which a l l ows 
the purposeful gen e ration of compl e x id e as; imag i nat i on 
also plays an equally important role. 
Memory and imagination allow us to reproduce previous 
impressions in the form of ideas, and just like impressions 
and ideas, they are primarily differentiated by the force 
and vivacity by which they are experienced, or pr e sent 
their products to consciousness.
8 There is a quality, a 
sense of affirmation, a strength or liveliness which 
attends the recollection of my activities this morning, 
which is not present when I plan and imagine what I shall 
do tomorrow. 
'Tis evident that the memory preserves the original 
form, in which its objects were presented, and that 
where-ever we depart from it in recollecting any thing, 
it proceeds from some defect or imperfection in that 
faculty.9 
The imagination, on the other hand, unlike "the memory 
[which] is in a manner ty'd down ... without any power of 
· t · " 1 O t d f d . th varia ion, possesses grea power an ree om in e cou-
pling, separation, and rearrangement of ideas, and 
humankind's many rich and varied mythologies well attest to 
this activity. But obviously thought for most people does 
not consist of one fantasy after another throughout the 
8 Hume, Treatise, 8 - 9 pp. 
9 I bid. , 9 p. 
1 0 I b i d. , 9 p. 
3 
course of a normal day's activities; and evidently e nough 
regularity exists that we do in fact think in ways which 
resemble how it seems other people think as well. Also, 
except in cases where one is trying to sort out some com -
plex problem, for example, thought seems generally to flow 
along in ways more unconscious or automatic than purpose-
ful. Hume therefore argues for the existence . of . certain 
unifying principles which must be at work in giving to the 
imagination a direction and purpose which, alone, it would 
not normally possess. 
As all simple ideas may be separated by the imagina-
tion, and may be united again in what form it pleases, 
nothing wou'd be more unaccountable than the operations 
of that faculty, were it not guided by some universal 
principles, which render it, in some measure, uniform 
with itself in all times and places. Were ideas 
entirely loose and unconnected, chance alone wou'd join 
them; and 'tis impossible the same simple ideas should 
fall regularly into complex ones (as they commonly do) 
without some bond of union among them, some associating 
quality, by which one idea naturally introduces 
another.11 
This "associating quality" which aids the imagination in 
its manipulation of ideas in ways which convincingly mask 
the inherent singularity of our perceptions, consists of 
what are referred to as relations. 
Curiously, given the importance of relations to Hume's 
philosophy, 12 the section devoted to relations in the 
1 1 Hume, Treatise, p. 10 
1 2 Norman Kemp Smith believes that Hume's greatest contri-
bution is his theory of belief: "this new doctrine of be .lief 
[is] certainly one of the most essential, and perhaps the 
most characteristic doctrine in Hume's philosophy," " Th e 
Naturalism of Hume" Mind 54 (April 1905) p. 151. This i s 
4 
Treatise is brief in the extreme, although c o n siderable 
time is spent in Part 3 of Book 1 analy z in g th e im p or t a nt 
1 3 
relation of cause and effect. Human thought, a s we k n ow 
it, could not exist without relations: 
All kinds of reasoning consists in nothing but a com -
parison, and a discovery of those relations, eith e r 
constant or inconstant, which two or more objects bear 
to each other. This comparison we may make, either when 
both the objects are present to the senses, or when 
neither of them is present, or when only one.14 
"All kinds of reasoning" encompasses both the formal, as in 
pure logic and mathematics, and the informal, having to do 
with the common occurrences of daily life. Later, in the 
not Hume's own evaluation though: "if anything can entitle 
the author to so glorious a name as that of an inventor, 
'tis the use he makes of the association of ideas, which 
enters into most of his philosophy" (Treatise, pp. 661-62). 
The "association of ideas" of which Hume speaks here, com-
prises the relations of resemblance, contiguity, and cause 
and effect. My point is that, in the end, Kemp Smith's con-
tention is little different from Hume's original estimate; 
for Hume tells us "that all belief arises from the associa-
tion of ideas, according to my hypothesis." Treatise, 
p. 11 2 
1 3 
David Armstrong in Universals: An Opinionated Introduc-
tion (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 29-30, suggests 
that the brevity of Hume's account may be due to the tradi-
tion established by Aristotle of classifying relations as 
being at the bottom of the ontological scale. See 
Aristotle's The Metaphysics, translated by John H. McMahon 
(Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1991) 1088a. Armstrong goes on 
to write: 
1 4 
Philosophy has been a long time coming to grips with 
the category of relation .... The categories of substance 
(thing) and attribute (property) are long established, 
but not so the category of relation. It is not until 
the late nineteenth and twentieth c e ntury with C. S. 
Peirce, William James, and Bertrand Russell that rela-
tions begin (no more than begin) to come into focus. 
p. 29 
Hume, Treatise, p. 73 
5 
Enquiri e s, this distinction is refl e ct e d in Hume ' s cate-
1 5 
gories of "Relations of Ideas, and Ma tt e rs of Fac t;" but 
in the Treatise, Hume's sketch of our relational l a nd sca pe 
takes the form of a differentiation bet wee n those r e lat i ons 
which are natural, and those which are philosophical: 
The word Relation is commonly used in two senses con-
siderably different from each other. Either for that 
quality, by which two ideas are connected together in 
the imagination, and the one naturally introduces the 
other, after the manner above-explained; or for that 
particular circumstance, in which, even upon the arbi-
trary union of two ideas in the fancy, we may think 
proper to compare them. In common language the former 
is always the sense, in which we use the word,rela-
tion; and 'tis only in philosophy, that we extend it to 
mean any particular subject of comparison, without a 
connecting principle. 16 
There are three natural relations, and Hume sees them as 
resulting from "original qualities of human nature
1117 viz., 
"Resemblance, Contiguity in time and place, and Cause and 
1 8 
Effect." Thus, the natural relations are seen as evidenc-
ing the biological prerequisites necessary for us to extend 
our proclivity to compare into every corner of human exper-
ience. The philosophical relations are seven in number: 
resemblance, identity, space and time, quantity or number, 
quality, contrariety, and cause and effect.
19 It will be 
1 5 Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding 
cerning the Principles of Morals, 3rd ed., ed., P. 
Nidditch . (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 25 
1 6 Hu~e, .Treatise, p. 15-16 
1 7 Ibid., p. 13 
and Con-
H. 
1. 8 Ibid., p. 11. These three relations form the basis of 
what was referred to during the late ninet ee nth and e arl y 
t wenti e th c e ntury as the "laws -of ass o ciati o n." Pr omin e nt 
asso ciationists of this p e riod were Jo h n St ua r t Mi ll ( 1806-
18 7 3 ) a nd Al ex and e r Bain (1818 - 19 03). 
1 9 
I bid., p p. 14 - 15, Th e re has b ee n so me de b ate during the 
6 
notic e d that th e rel a tions of r e s e mbl a nc e and cause and 
e ffect appear in both lists. This i s b e c a u se Hume sees 
resemblance as being in some d e gr e e "n e c e ss a ry to al l phil-
· 1120 h'l th th h d o sophical relation, w i eon e o e r an , " causation 
is the most extensive" and important of all the r e la -
t . 21 ions: 
And indeed there is nothing existent, either e xt e rnally 
or internally, which is not to be consider'd either as 
a cause or an effect; tho' 'tis plain there is no o n e 
quality, which universally belongs to all beings, and 
gives them a title to that denomination.22 
The philosophical relations are divided into t wo groups 
with respect to their ability to either serve as "the 
objects of knowledge and certainty,
1123 or not. The first 
group have to do only with the intrinsic characteristics of 
ideas themselves, and are "resemblance, contrariety, 
degrees in quality, and proportions in quantity or 
number. 1124 Such relations as these are intuitively or 
demonstrably ascertained , while those in the second group, 
identity , relations of time and place and causation, are 
d d t d · 
25 Lt b . th' epen en on memory an experience. e us now ring is 
last 200 years as to the adequacy of Hume's list of philo-
sophical relations. Today, rather than compiling various 
lists, most simply refer to all relations as being philo-
sophical in nature. Armstrong, in Universals, believes that 
given the topic, Hume's list is probably as adequate as any 
could be. p. 29 
20 Hume, Treatise, p. 14 
21 Ibid. , 1 2 p. 
22 I bid. , 75 p. 
23 I bid. , 70 p. 
2 4 I b i d. , 70 p. 
25 I b id . , 69 - 70 pp. 
7 
sketch of several of Hume's first principles into focus by 
consideri ng what I take to be the mandate of empiricism as 
expressed in Hume's introduction to the Treatise. 
In Hume's day, as in our own, the various sciences were 
progressing with great rapidity. Hume felt that above all 
else what was lacking was a foundation more secure than had 
been supplied by either the rationalism of the sc h olastic 
doctors, or the theologian's appeal to authority. He would 
supply this foundation, and it would take the form of a 
"science of man," i.e., a science of human nature. Simply 
put, it is always "we" who know, so it is with human nature 
that we begin. Hume wastes no time in informing us what are 
to be the guiding principles of this new science: 
And as the science of man is the only solid founda-
tion for the other sciences, so the only solid 
foundation we can give to the science itself must be 
laid on experience and observation.26 
This is again emphasized when he speaks of both "the 
schools of the philosophers" and "all the sciences:" "None 
of them can go beyond experience, or establish any princi-
ples which are not founded on that authority. 1127 And 
finally, a passage which summarizes the preceding, while 
also pointing us in the direction of our eventual consider-
ation of the relations between the members of a community, 
is the following: 
26 
27 
We must therefore glean up our experiments in this 
Hume , Treatise, p. xv i 
Ibid ., p. xvii 
8 
sci e nce from a cautious observation of hum a n lif e , and 
take them as they appear in the common course of th e 
world, by men's behaviour in company, in affairs, and 
in their pleasures. Where experiments of this kin d ar e 
judiciously collected and compared, we may hope to 
establish on them a science, which will not be inferi o r 
in certainty, and will be much su~erior in utility to 
any other of human compr e hension. 8 
For Hume, reason in its strict sense can tell us nothing 
about the real world; its operations within the realm of 
"relations of ideas" drastically limits its sphere of influ-
ence. The final court of appeal is human experience, in all 
its rich diversity. And this I take to be the mandate of 
empiricism. 
It is now only natural to enquire how fully Hume fol-
lows his own recommendations. Regarding the "spirit of the 
law" so to speak, most would agree that Hume attempts to 
follow his own injunctions; but as to the "letter of the 
law," many see Hume as having drifted from the path on a 
number of important issues. And for James, this applies to 
Hume's treatment of relations in particular. Let us first, 
though, look at the two primary elements of consciousness: 
impressions and ideas. 
If our appeals are to be to experience, from what 
experience are these elements derived? Can they be, for 
example, confirmed by demonstrations, proofs, or probabili-
ties as we are advised by Hume to consider when evaluating 
29 
any argument? I think not. It would seem that Hume 
28 
Hume, Treatise, p. xix. In these passages Hume is of 
c ourse not thinking of either pure logic or mathematics. 
29 
Hume, Enquiries, p. 56. See Hume's footnot e . 
9 
himself provides a priori definitions of impressions and 
ideas. And thus, the first principles which subsequently 
follow, should be seen as being merely derivations from 
definitions. Interestingly, Hume warns us against the 
occurrence of this very situation: 
If we reason a priori, anything may appear able to pro-
duce anything. The falling of a p eb ble may, for aught 
we know, extinguish the sun; or the wish of a man con-
trol the planets in their orbits.30 
And in a more vigorous passage he exhorts us: 
When we run over libraries, persuaded of these 
principles, what havoc must we make? If we take in our 
hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for 
instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract rea-
soning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it 
contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of 
fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: 
for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illu-
sion.31 
In these passages Hume could be seen as actually condemning 
his own practices, though he is more than likely referring 
to the medieval schoolmen and their philosophical descend-
ants. Still, I think most will agree that he gives a 
measure of reality to impressions and ideas which he 
refuses to extend to any relation other than the three 
associative relations. Fraser Cowley writes: 
30 
It is because the doctrine of impressions and ideas is 
not regarded as a hypothesis but self-evident, that it 
is never fully formulated and always remains radically 
obscure and ambiguous.32 
Hume, Enquiries, p. 164. 
and effe ct, though we should 
cause ideas. 
This passage concerns cause 
remember that impressions 
31 Ibid. , p. 1 6 5 
32 
Fraser Cowley, A Critique of British Empiricism (New 
York: ST Martin 's Press, 1968), p. 12 
1 0 
Common se n se , though, see ms to co n firm t o all of us that we 
rea lly do hav e a ll sort s of r e l a t i on a l ideas every day of 
our liv e s, and indeed, would not ex p e ri e nc e th e world as we 
do unl e ss they we re also a v a l i d a nd i nt egral part of that 
s e lf-same experience. T. H. Gre en, in his f a mous i n tr od uc -
tion to the Treatise calls Hume 's copy th e o r y of i d e as i n t o 
question, and in so doing, clearly states th e probl e m: 
The question, then, that he had to deal with was, to 
what impressions he could reduce those conceptions of 
relation--of cause and effect, substance and attribute, 
and identity--which all knowledge involves.33 
Hume does not dodge the question raised by Green, and 
informs us what he likewise believes logically follows from 
it: 
All events seem entirely loose and separate. One event 
follows another; but we never can observe any tie 
between them. They seem conjoined, but never connected. 
And as we can have no idea of any thing which never 
appeared to our outward sense or inward sentiment, the 
necessary conclusion seems to be that we have no idea 
of connexion or power at all, and that these words are 
absolutely without any meaning, when employed either in 
philosophical reasonings or common life.34 
The preceding remarks would seem to settle the ques-
tion, at least as far as Hume is concerned, once and for 
all; but Hume sees that such scepticism must be moderated, 
and in the very next section he tells us: "But there still 
remains one method of avoiding this conclusion, and one 
source which we have not yet e x amin e d. 1135 Hume's sol u tio n 
33 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, a nd Di al ou ge s 
Con ce rning Natural Religion, 3 vols, e ds. T . H. Gr ee n, 
T . H. Grose, new edn. r e vis e d by T. H. Gros e ( Lo ndon : 
Longma ns Gr e en, and Co, 1878), 1, p. 162 
34 Hume , Enquir ie s, p. 74 
35 Ibid ., p. 74 
1 1 
h arke n s b ac k to the i ntro d uct io n of th e Treatise , for th e 
11 11 k · . 36 B t ' t . t s ourc e of which he s pea sis ex p e ri e nc e . u 1 is no 
to the common - sense suppo s ition of ex p e r ie nc e d relations to 
which he appeals; it is to our ex p e ri e nc e o f cons tant c on-
junction and feeling. 
[A]fter a repetition of similar instances, the mind is 
carried by habit, upon the appe a ranc e of one e v e nt, t o 
expect its usual attendant, and to believe that it wi ll 
exist. This connexion, therefore, which we feel in t h e 
mind, this customary transition of the imagination fro m 
one object to its usual attendant, is the senti me n t or 
impression from which we form the idea of po wer or nec-
essary connexion ... What alteration has happened to g iv e 
rise to this new idea of connexion? Nothing but that he 
now feels these events to be connected in his imagina-
tion ... When we say, therefore, that one object is 
connected with another, we mean only that they have 
acquired a connexion in our thought ... 37 
Evidently then, our experience of relations is really only 
a fiction, for all that is ever involved is the experience 
of constant conjunction, and the e xperience of a certain 
feeling. The idea we have of connection is a copy of an 
impression arising from these easy transitions of the imag-
ination. Indeed, Hume confirms that "This easy transition 
. h ff th f 1 · "
3 8 h t is tee ect, or ra er essence o re ation... W a 
then do we have? And what is the true import of this some-
what mysterious feeling mentioned by Hume? Both questions 




Hume categorizes belief as 
something felt by the mind, whi c h distinguish e s th e 
Hume, Tr e atise, p. x vi 
Hume , Enquir i e s, pp. 7 5- 76 
Hume , Trea t ise , p. 220 
1 2 
the ideas of the judgement from the fictions of the 
imagination. It gives them more force and influence; 
makes them appear of greater importance; infix es them 
in th e mind ; and renders th e m th e gov rning principl es 
of all our actions.40 
Hume is obviously convinced that real belief can not be 
turned off and on like a water faucet, especially if it has 
the importance which the last line of the above quote 
implies. But belief should not be thought of as merely the 
addition of some new idea to the idea under consideration 
either. 
But I go farther; and not content with asserting, that 
the conception of the existence of any object is no 
addition to the simple conception of it, I likewise 
maintain, that the belief of the existence joins no new 
ideas to those, which compose the idea of the object. 
When I think of God, when I think of him as existent, 
and when I believe him to be existent, my idea of him 
neither encreases nor diminishes.41 
This characterization of belief as a certain way of con-
ceiving ideas is held to throughout Hume's treatment: 
"belief is nothing but a more vivid, lively, forcible, 
firm, steady conception of an object, than what the imagi-
nation alone is ever able . to attain.
1142 Any impression can 
communicate a portion of its "force and vivacity" to a 
related idea, and this is what occurs in the case of 
belief.
43 The importance of belief to our apprehension of 
relations is thus way out of proportion to Hume's simple, 
almost naive account of it, for in the end it is only "a 
40 Hurne, Treatise, 629 p. 
41 Ibid. , 94 p. 
42 Hurne, Eng_uiries, p. 49 
43 Hume , Treatise, p. 98 
1 3 
t . . 114 4 lively idea relat e d to a pr ese n impr e ssion ... 
Be lief, th e n, is Hume 's h e roic s olution to th e p r o bl em 
of experienced relations. Working within the boundari e s 
imposed upon him by the empiricism of Locke and Berkel e y in 
general, and the theory of ideas in particular, this result 
should not seem surprising. Even so, many philosophers have 
seen Hume's solution as ultimately doing little to success-
fully resolve the scepticism inherent in the theory of 
ideas. Thomas Reid (1710-1796) gives this colorful judge-
ment: 
The theory of ideas, like the Trojan horse, had a 
specious appearance both of innocence and beauty; but 
if those philosophers had known that it carried in its 
belly death and destruction to all science and common 
sense, they would not have broken down their walls to 
give it admittance.45 
Hume's philosophy, though a brilliant beginning, ultimately 
fails by being insufficiently empirical. Hume seeks to base 
his philosophy on an unswerving appeal to experience; yet 
the a priori elements of impressions and ideas force him 
into an erroneous view of experience which is both frag-
mented and deficient. Sadly, this has caused Hume's 
philosophy to gravitate back and forth between common sense 
and scepticism to this day. 
For much of James' philosophy, this is the point at 
which he b e gins. He feels HumG1 s philosophy can b e 
44 Hume, Treatise, p. 98 
45 Thomas Reid, Inquiry and Essays (Indian a polis: Hack e tt 
Publishing Co., Inc., 1983), p. 61 
1 4 
- 1· 
corrected ; whereas Kant ' s , for exam pl e , can not. This being 
the case, Ralph Barton Perry makes this observation: 
The key to James' relations with Hume is to be found in 
the fact that he studi ed him in the edition by Green 
and Grose ; and approach ed the text of t he Treatise by 
way of Green's famous ' Introduction ,' in which Hume was 
charged wit:h a failur e to provide for _relations. 46 
James is in agreement with Green's initial evaluation of 
the problem, but is just as quick to bemoan his rational-
istic solution: 
Green more than any one realized that Knowledge about 
things was knowledge of their relations; but nothing 
could persuade him that our sensational life could con-
tain any relational element. He followed the strict 
intellectualist method with sensations. What they are 
not defined as including, they must exclude. Sensations 
are not defined as relations, so in the end Green 
thought that they could get related together only by 
the action on them from above of a 'self-distinguish-
ing' absolute and eternal mind, present to that whi ch 
is related, but not related itself.47 
Neither the terms of experience, nor the relations whi ch 
connect them, stand in any need of transcendental support. 
Also, belief, though important, need not be made to bear 
the whole burden of experienced relations. James' empiri-
cism offers another solution; and it does so by simply 
being consistent, and therefore, "radical." 
46 
Every examiner of the sensible life in concreto must 
see that relations of every sort, of time, space,dif-
ference, likeness, change, rate, cause, or what not, 
are just as integral members of the sensational flux as 
terms are, and that conjunctive relations are just as 
Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of 
William James, 2 vols, {Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood 
Press , Publishers, 1974), 1, p. 551 
47 
William James, A Pluralistic Universe 
Longmans , Green , and Co., 1909), p . 278 
1 5 
{New York: 
true. members of the flux as disjunctive relations are . 
This is what ... I have called the 'r adically empiricist ' 
d t · 48 oc rine ... 
Certainly constant conjunction and habit can and do 
engender feelings of reasonableness concerning the reality 
of connections, but this is not the only way this can 
occur, nor even the most important. Experience is not nec-
essarily one of singularity--as the nominalism of classical 
empiricism encourages us to believe--we experience many 
things: various terms, various conjunctions and disjunc-
tions, and at times, only chaos and confusion. In thus 
distinguishing himself from Hume, James' empiricism does 
does not begin by stipulating that experience must of 
necessity correspond to this or that a priori distinction. 
When we cut experience up into parts, or make distinctions, 
or evaluate it, or organize it, or whatever, it is for some 
purely "willful" human end, not because either brain physi-
ology or the ultimate nature of reality has forced us to do 
so. James asks us to accept our experiences as they are 
initally given, or, as it were, at their "face value." And 
this means that regarding experience as such, 
[we] take it just as we feel it, and not to confuse 
ourselves with abstract talk about it, involving words 
that drive us to invent secondary conceptions in order 
to neutralize their suggestions and to mak~ our actual 
experience again seem rationally possible.49 
This does not mean that a given experience is therefore 
48 
James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 279-80 
49 
William James, Essays in Radical Empiricism (New York: 
Longmans , Green and Co., 1922), pp. 48-49 
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necessarily true--only furth er experience can v e rify thi s --
• II 1 1150 ' t ' ' f but it does mean that it is rea . James is s riving or 
a consistent empiricism. This allows him to remark that "we 
ought to say a feeling of and, a fe eli ng of if, a feeling 
of but, and a feeling of !2.Y_, quite as readily as we say a 
51 feeling of blue of a feeling of cold." 
As we see, James' radical empiricism is a return to, 
and continuation of, empiricism's original mandate; i.e., 
the uncompromising appeal to human experience in all its 
richness and diversity, accepting everything, rejecting 
nothing. And the cornerstone of radical empiricism is 
James ' theory of relations. It is this, as we shall see in 
the next chapter, which allows him to affirm the reality of 
the relation of self. Thus, looking forward, we proceed 
from relations proper, to the relation of self, and hence, 
to the relation of selves known as the community. 
50 Sing-nan Fen, in "Has James Answered Hume?", The Jour-
nal of Philosophy, 49, (1952), p. 161, makes this same 
important distinction with respect to causal relations: 
It goes without saying that, to James, the "truth" 
of a specific causal relationship can not be verified 
by our feeling alone. However, the fact that we do have 
a direct feeling of causality is the most direct demon-
stration of the fact that causal relationship is 
"real," although it is not necessarily always "true." 
Much of Fen's article, though brief, is an interesting 
attempt to apply James' theory of relations to a number of 
philosophy's thorniest issues. 
51 
William James, The Principles of Psychology, 2 vols, 
(New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1950), 1, pp. 245-46 





THE RELATION OF SELF 
Just as we can not speak of community without first 
giving an account of relations, it is likewise important 
that we give an account of the individual selves so 
related. I therefore proceed by exploring James' concept of 
the self. 
As in the first chapter, we again begin with Hume. This 
is because it is primarily against the context of Hume's 
remarks concerning personal identity, that James' own 
notion of the self is developed. And in this light, it is 
interesting to note that Hume's treatment of the topic is 
not one with which even he is overly pleased. In his 
"Appendix" to the Treatise, he addresses this issue. 
But upon a more strict review of the section concerning 
personal identity, I find myself involv'd in such a 
labyrinth, that , I must confess, I neither know how to 
correct my former opinions, nor how to render them con-
sistent. 1 
Evidently then, Humes wishes his remarks on personal iden-
tity to be seen as somewhat provisional, and considering he 
chooses to say nothing at all on the subject in the 
Enquiries, we may safely conclude that this was his posi-
tion to the end. Nevertheless, his treatment of the self 
remains a powerful force within the philosophy of mind to 
1 
Hume, Treatise, p. 633 
1 8 
this day. 
Hume agrees that for most people the existence of the 
self, and its continuance through time, is a commonplace. 
We seem to possess compl ete assurance in this matter, our 
conviction approaching a level of certainty usually reserved 
only for the demonstrations of logic or mathematics. But 
upon what evidence are such strong beliefs based? Hume 
searches for this evidence in the same way as he did 
regarding the status of relations, in our first chapter. 
There, we saw him concerned as to which impression our idea 
of relation or connection is a copy, and he asks of the 
self the same question: 
from what impression cou'd this idea be deriv'd? ... 'tis 
a question, which must necessarily be ans wer'd, if we 
wou'd have the idea of the self pass for clear and 
intelligible. It must be some one impression, that 
gives rise to every real idea.2 
Hume takes a partial survey of his own stock of impres-
sions, and reports upon what he finds: 
For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I 
call myself, I always stumble on some particular per-
ception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love 
or hatred, pain or pleasure.3 
Hume does not find any one impression which corresponds to 
the idea of the self as something simple, and maintaining 
its identity through time. And since every "real idea" is 
copied from an impression, we have no "real idea" of the 
self. The evidence points in only one direction, viz., that 
2 
3 
Hume, Treatise, p. 251 
Ibid ., p. 252 
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we " ... are nothing but a bundle or collection of different 
perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconc eivable 
4 
rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement." 
Although Hume views the terms mind and self as being 
roughly interchangeable, we might be t empted to substitute 
the concept of mind in place of the self in the hope of 
avoiding at least some of Hume's objections. And Hume does 
go so far as to compare the mind to a theatre, where per-
ceptions, like the actors, come and go, reappear, mingle, 
and separate again. 5 But he just as quickly warns against 
stretching the analogy too far; the mind's ontological sta-
tus is no different than that of the self, and the 
arguments used against the reality of the self, apply 
equally to the mind. 
I desire those philosophers, ·who pretend that we have an 
idea of the substance of our minds, to point out the 
impression that produces it, and tell distinctly after 
what manner that impression operates, and from what 
object it is deriv'd.6 
We will have no more success here, than we did with respect 
to the self: "They are the successive perceptions only, 
that constitute the mind .... 117 Thus, whether we speak of 
the self, the mind, or even of substance in general, all 
are open to the same objection. But we should consider that 
our perceptions have no need of any substance for their 
4 Hume, Treatise, 253 p. 
5 Ibid., 253 p. 
6 Ibid., 233 p. 
7 Ibid ., 253 p. 
20 
support in the first place. They need nothing in which to 
in here: 
since all our perceptions are different from each 
other, and from every thing else in the universe, they 
are also distinct and separable, and may be consider'd 
as separately existent, and may exist separately, and 
have no need of any thing else to support their exist-
ence.8 
Indeed, given the nature of our perceptions, and defining 
substance as " ... something, that can exist by itself, 'tis 
evident every perception is a substance, and every distinct 
part of a perception a distinct substance .... 119 
Why, then, this great propensity to ascribe unity to 
to diversity? Why do we insist on giving identity to that 
which has none? Again, much of the answer was given in the 
first chapter. Recall what occurs during a single instance 
of cause and effect. There, a close relation between two 
terms allows for an easy transition by the imagination from 
one to another. So effortlessly does this transition take 
place, that we come to believe that an actual connection 
exists, where there is none; we have confused connection 
with conjunction. In the case of personal identity, though, 
we have moved from the consideration of one conjunction, to 
an entire series of successive conjunctions, but the same 
associative principles are still at work. 
8 
9 
'Tis, therefore, on some of these three relations of 
resemblance, contiguity and causation, that identity 
depends; and as the very essence of these relations 
Hume, Treatise, p. 233 
Ibid ., p. 244 
21 
consists in their producing an easy transition of ideas ; it 
follows, that our notions of personal identity, proceed 
e ntirely from the smooth and uninterrupt ed progress of the 
thought along a train of connected ideas .... 10 
The identity which we attribute to our changing perceptions 
depends upon these principles of association, but what is 
the exact nature of this "progress of thought" which is so 
important to the emergence of the self? It is obviously 
more than just the imagination at work. It it true, the 
imagination can join together any two ideas, and associa-
tion does lend to its activities a certain un~formity and 
direction; but without a process of thought which is both 
remembering and selective, there can be no access to those 
perceptions which are past, and upon which so much of self-
hood depends. This important task is carried out by the 
faculty of memory. 
As memory alone acquaints us with the continuance and 
extent of this succession of perceptions, 'tis to be 
consider'd, upon that account chiefly, as the source of 
personal identity. Had we no memory, we never shou'd 
have any notion of causation, nor consequently of that 
chain of causes and effects, which constitute our self 
or person .... therefore, memory does not so much produce 
as discover personal identity, by shewing us the rela-
tion of cause and effect among our different 
perceptions.11 
And so, in the case of personal idently, we are likewise 
guilty of confusing connection with conjunction, but more 
importantly still, we have " ... confound[ed] identity with 




Hume, Treatise, p. 260 
Ibid., pp. 261-62 
Ibid ., p. 254 
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and pervasive; it is one from which we are not easily dis-
suaded . Philosophical analysis reveals our mistake, but 
this can not be maintained for long. We soon lapse into the 
old, well-worn channels of thought, and the comfortable 
fiction of the self is back with us again. 13 
James praises the ground-breaking work done by Hume and 
subsequent associationists. And it is done in such a way as 
to immediately inform us what his initial presuppositions 
concerning the self are, and how he plans to proceed. 
it is to the imperishable glory of Hume and Herbart and 
their successors to have taken so much of the meaning 
of personal identity out of the clouds and made of the 
Self an empirical and verifiable thing. 
But in leaving the matter here, and saying that 
this sum of passing things is all, these writers have 
neglected certain more subtle aspects of the Unity of 
C · 14 onsciousness .... 
As Hume and others have shown, the self is something which 
is found in experience, and can be verified by all who 
choose to do so. It is not the existence of the self which 
is in question; it is its nature which stands in need of 
clarification. Introspection and direct observation are the 




Hume, Treatise, p. 254 
James, Principles, 1, p. 336 
A word on James' use of introspection is called for. 
Myers refers to James as "one of the last major introspec-
tive psychologists prior to the behaviorist take-over." 
Gerald E. Myers, "Pragmatism and Introspective Psychology" 
in The Cambridge Companion to William James, ed., Ruth Anna 
Putnam (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 
p. 11. James' first important discussion of introspection, 
and of the failings of its early practitioners, is his 
article "On Some Omissions of Introspective Psychology," 
Mind 9 (1884), pp. 1-26. There, the failure of Hume and 
23 
thought s a nd f e elings, a nd as we ob ser v e the behavior of 
others, and listen to their reports, we inf e r th a t the y too 
find this to be the case. So far, so good; but Hume fin ds 
only bundles of p e rceptions, while J a me s fin ds much mor e , 
viz., the "Unity of Consciousness." 
James views Hume's conclusions as wrong primarily 
because the procedure used to arrive at them is completely 
backwards. We do not begin with mental atoms, or bits of 
consciousness, and by compounding them, arrive at the self. 
He writes: 
Most books start with sensations, as the simplest men-
tal facts, and proceed synthetically, constructing each 
higher stage from those below it. But this is abandon-
ing the empirical method of investigation. No one ever 
had a simple sensation by itself. Consciousness, from 
our natal day, is of a teeming multiplicity of objects 
and relations, and what we call simple sensations are 
results of discriminative attention, pushed often to a 
very high degree .... 16 The universal conscious fact is 
not 'feelings and thoughts exist,' but 'I think' and 'I 
feel.' No psychology, at any rate, can question the 
- existence of personal selves. The worst a psychology 
others to adequately deal with the empirical reality of 
felt relations, is discussed for the first time. The arti-
cle reads like a table of contents for many of the themes 
later dealt with at much greater length in Principles. In 
the chapter "The Methods and Snares of Psychology," his 
"general conclusion [is] that introspection is difficult 
and fallible; and that the difficulty is simply that of all 
observation of whatever kind." 1, p. 191. James sees no 
need to abandon introspection simply because it is not 
infallible. Its results are to be evaluated just as we 
would do with respect to any method. And this takes the 
form of a "consensus of our farther knowledge about the 
thing in question, later views correcting earlier ones .... " 
p. 192. James ends the chapter by advocating a plurality of 
methods: "introspection, experimentation, and comparison," 
p. 1 97 
1 6 
Jam e s, Principles, 1, p. 224 
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ca n do is s o to i n terpret th e nature of th es e selve s as 
to rob them of thei r worth .1 7 
Ever y t hou g ht, e v er y f ee l i ng , is personal . They do not fly 
ab o u t l oose. Th e y are a l ways own ed by someone . On an elec -
t r o c h e mical level, it is c e rta i nly prop e r to think of our 
men ta l liv e s in t e rms of this or th a t n e u ron o r s ynapse , 
this charg e or that charge, this c he mi cal or t ha t chemical ; 
but just as no compounding of disconnect e d n eu r ons, ele c-
trical charges, and chemicals ever produces a brain, n o 
compounding or bundling of disconnected ideas e v er pro du ces 
awareness. A bundle of disconnected ideas is no thought at 
all, it is just a bundle. And so, such a priori distinc-
tions as impressions and ideas are always "after the fact." 
They are the result of specific activities engaged in for 
specific purposes. They are not what anyone ever finds nat-
11 
. . . 1 8 ura y given in experience. 
Why, then, was the original mandate of empiricism so 
quickly set aside in favor of the metaphysical constructs 
and principles of the theory of ideas? What was it about 
the theory of ideas which made it so attractive? The ans wer 
is to be found in the early empiricist's infatuation with, 
and emulation of, science and scientific method. Now, J ame s 
holds that the essential feature of science is its reduc-
tionism. 
1 7 
Ja me s, Prin c ipl e s, 1, p. 2 26 
1 8 
For mo re on th e co mpoun ding o f conscio u sness , see Prin -
cipl e s , 1, pp . 158 - 162 . Also , James ' A Pluralistic 
Univ e rse , pp . 18 1-22 1. 
25 
The aim of science is always to reduce complexity to 
simplicity ; and in psychological science we have the 
celebrated 'theory of ideas' which, admitting the great 
difference among each other of what may be called con-
crete conditions of mind, seeks to show how this is all 
the resultant effect of variat ions in the combination 
of certain simple eleme nts of consciousness that always 
remain the same. These mental atoms or molecules are 
what Locke called 'simple ideas. •19 
From the earliest days of Greek science to modern times, 
science has always sought to reduce the apparent chaos and 
confusion of the natural world to the simplicity and order 
to be found in the fewest possible number of general prin-
ciples, and for Locke, Hume, and others, philosophy could 
do no better. 20 Science's nominalistic attitude, and empir-
icism, were, thus, early partners, but it was a 
collaboration which, though entered into with the best 
intentions, could only end in scepticism; for now, we are 
unable to speak of the self or ego without first engaging 
in empiricism's typical method of nominalistic reduction-
ism, in this case, the felt need to reduce to order the 
present thought. The present thought's apparent unity and 
completeness is illusionary; it is really a compound of 
many bits and pieces, often chaotic. A reduction or 
1 9 James, Principles, 1, p. 230 
20 See Edwin A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of 
Modern Physical Science, rev. ed. (Atlantic Highlands, New 
Jersey: Humanities Press, 1992), p. 34. Here, he writes: 
In these circumstances it is easy to understand how 
modern philosophy might have been led into certain puz-
zles .... a penetrating study of post-Newtonian 
philosophers quickly reveal s the fact that they were 
philosophizing quite definitely in the light of his 
[Newton's] achievements, and with his metaphysics espe-
cially in mind. 
26 
dissection must be performed before we can hope to arrive 
at the true nature of the self. The result is an easily 
studied and manipulated handful of elements , principl es , 
and distinctions which can then only be reass embled by the 
addition of more of the same; e.g., various faculties of 
consciousness. But in our attempt to describe the self, no 
such reduction need be made. "What we see" is 
' not only 
"what we get" it is also all there is to get. 
Our Thought is not composed of parts, however so com-
posed its objects may be. There is no originally 
chaotic manifold in it to be reduced to order .... If we 
are to have a dualism of Thought and Reality at all, 
the multiplicity should be lodged in the latter and not 
in the former member of the couple of related terms. 
The parts and their relations surely belong less to the 
knower than to what is known.21 
Let us return to, and amplify, James' statement of a 
moment ago that the self is both "empirical and verifi-
able." Insofar as we can say that we have any knowledge of 
feelings at all, we can also say we have knowledge of self, 
because, as James is anxious to make clear, the experience 
of self is one which is felt. 
21 
22 
It may be all that Transcendentalists say it is, and 
all that Empiricists say it is into the bargin, but it 
is at any rate no mere ens rationis, cognized only in 
an intellectual way, and no mere summation of memories 
or mere sound of a word in our ears. It is something 
with which we also have direct sensible acquaintance, 
and which is as fully present at any moment of con-
sciousness in which it is present, as in a whole life-
time of such moments .... in the stream of consciousness 
it never ... [is] found all alone. But when it is found, 
i t is felt; just as the body is felt .... 22 
James, Principles, 1, p. 363 
Ibid ., pp . 298-99 
27 
Hume wa s one of the first to call th e a tt e nt ion of philos-
ophy back to the importance which our s e nt ime nts must have 
in any account of experience, when he p r oclaim ed t hat t h e 
basis of all morality was sentiment, rather than r eason . 
This notion of the readmission of the vague back i n to phi l-
osophy, is an important issue for James also: "It is, in 
short, the re-instatement of the vague to its proper place 
in our mental life which I am so anxious to press on the 
attention. 1123 Feelings are hard to quantify, and science, 
with its nominalism, has always been uneasy as to how to 
deal with them. James' plea for philosophy though, is that, 
if it is to be thoroughly empirical, we can ill afford to 
ignore or reject whole areas of experience simply because 
they are imprecise, indistinct, and not easily conceptual-
ized. And again, concepts are always "after the fact." They 
are things which we "do" to experience, rather than find 
"in" experience, though this distinction often becomes lost 
in the process of trying to understand what we have 
described. In the posthumously published work Some Problems 
of Philosophy, James addresses the distinction between per-
ception and conception at length. 
23 
Whenever we conceive a thing we define it; and if 
we still don't understand, we define our definition .... 
This habit of telling what everything is becomes invet-
erate. The farther we push it, the more we learn about 
our subject of discourse, and we end by thinking that 
knowing the latter always consists in getting farther 
and farther away from the perceptual type of 
Jame s, Pr i ncipl es , 1, p. 254 
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ex perie nce. This uncriticiz ed habit, added to the 
intrinsic charm of the conceptual form, is the source 
of 'intellectualism' in philosophy.24 
James goes on to propose a pragmatic resolution of the t en -
sion whic h exis ts b e tw een our percepts and concepts . 
Since it is only the conceptual form which forces 
the dialectic contradictions upon the innocent sensible 
reality, the remedy would seem to be simple. Use con-
cepts when they help, and drop them when they hinder 
understanding; and take reality bodily and integrally 
up into philosophy in exactly the perceptual shape in 
which it comes. The aboriginal flow of feeling sins 
only by a quantitative defect.25 
The self is felt, and therefore empirical and verifi-
able in that sense. Our descriptions of it will employ 
those concepts found to be useful to this end. So, of what 
does the feeling of self consist? James warns us that his 
description is, after all, only of himself. We should not 
expect it to apply to everyone in every detail; but he 
evidently believes enough commonalities do exist to the 
extent that his findings can be fruitfully discussed, and 
from them, a general account given of how others likewise 
experience selfhood. Introspection reveals much activity. 
A constant play of furtherances and hindrances in my 
thinking, of checks and releases, tendencies which run 
the other way .... welcoming or opposing, appropriating 
or disowning, striving with or against, saying yes or 
no.26 
Such activities are felt. And almost all attempts to 
describe them in more detail, simply end up as a 
24 
William James, Some Problems of Philosophy: A Beginning 
of an Introduction to Philosophy (London: Longmans, Green 
and Co., 1948), p. 83 
25 Ibid ., p. 95 
26 
James, Principles , 1, p. 299 
29 
descripti o n of this or that feeling. Int r o spec t io n s of this 
sort are difficult, and often "all [Jam e s] ... can e v e r feel 
distinctly is some bodily process, for the most pa rt t a k i ng 
place within the head."
27 Other "head-f ee lings" a r e t hose 
28 
associated with the eyeballs, eyelids, brows, and throat. 
Sometimes "head-feelings" get "swallowed up" by feelings 
29 
pouring in from other parts of the body. James does not 
wish to say that this is all the feeling of self consists 
of, but this is that of which he is "most distinctly 
aware. 1130 
An important part of the experience of self is, there-
fore, this largely undifferentiated mass of bodily 
feelings. James also discerns another feeling often 
reported upon, "an obscurer feeling of something 
"31 th. . more.... Is is finally the feeling of thought viewing 
itself, or the true essence of the pronouns "I" or "me?" 
James has no definite answer, but wishes to keep the ques-
tion open. 32 How, then, do all of these feelings, thoughts, 
and sensations get sorted out, claimed, and ultimately 
identified as me and mine? It is not by way of the soul, it 
is not due to the Humean faculties of consciousness, nor 
the transcendent arch-ego of the rationalists. None of the 
27 James, Principles, 1 ' 300 p. 
28 Ibid. , pp. 300-301 
29 Ibid. , p. 301 
30 I bid. , 301 p. 
3 1 I bid. , 305 p. 
32 I b i d. , 305 p. 
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above can actually be found in experience , and in th e end, 
must be seen for the a priori creations that they are. 
Still, "common -se n se insists, there must be a real propri-
etor " if our notions of personal identity are to have any 
1 . 33 rea mea ning. J ames' answer will not please those seek-
ing more than what is already given in experience, for the 
"proprietor" is none other than the present thinking 
thought: "The passing Thought then seems to be the 
Thinker .... 1134 How can personal identity exhibit the unity 
which is its hallmark if this is actually the case? James 
offers the analogy of a herdsman and his herd. "The beasts 
stick together by sticking severally to him. 1135 This 
"herdsman" or "proprietor" is 
the real, present onlooking, remembering, 'judging 
thought' or identifying 'section' of the stream. This 
is what collects, 'owns' some of the past facts which 
it surveys, and disowns the rest,--and so makes a unity 
that is actualized and anchored and does not merely 
float in the blue air of possibility. And the reality 
of such pulses of thought, with their function of know-
ing, it will be remembered that we did not seek to 
deduce or explain, but simply assumed them as the ulti-
mate kind of fact that the psychologist must admit to 
exist.36 
In associationism, all the thoughts and feelings simply get 
gummed together of their own accord. James, on the other 
hand, sees the present passing thought's ability to "appro-
priate," or, as it were, to make judgements and choices in 
33 James , Principles, 1 ' 337 p. 
34 Ibid . , 342 p. 
35 Ibid. , 337 p . 
36 Ibid . , 338 p. 
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llyht or t he felt warmth , intimacy , and c o nt i nui t y of o t her 
thoughts and feeli ngs , as constituting the r e al and v e rifi -
able u n i ty of th e se l f . 37 I n Pri n ciples , James struggl e s to 
k h · t . . 38 t h f eep his met ap ysics o a mi nimum ; ere ore , the sp e cial 
attrib ut es of this "puls e of tho ug h t ... [ or ] vehicle of the 
judgem e nt of identity, 1139 required for all of th is to actu-
ally be the case, are, again, simply a ssume d. 
One must beg memory, knowledge on the part of the feel-
ings of something outside themselves. That grant e d, 
every other true thing follows naturally, and it i s 
hard to go astray. The knowledge the present feel i ng 
has of the past ones is a real tie bet ween th em , so is 
their resemblance; so is their continuity; so is the 
one's 'appropriation' of the other: all are real ties, 
realized in the judging Thought of every moment .... The 
way in which the present Thought appropriates the past 
is a real way, so long as no other owner appropriates 
it in a more real way, and so long as the Thought has 
no grounds for repudiating it stronger than those which 
lead to its appropriation.40 
As we have seen, the experience of self, or the feeling 
of self, is the feeling of relations. It is the feeling of 
things related, and of things being related. Considerations 
such as these lead James to refer to the "self-relation" as 
the "most intimate of all conjunctive relations .... 1141 
37 For more on James' notion of "approp r iation," see 





J a me s writes: 
a s psychologists, we need not be metaphysical at a l l. 
Th e phenomena are enough, the passing t h ought i t sel f is 
the only verifiable thinker, and its empi r ic al c onne c -
tion wi th the brain-p r oc e ss is th e ult ima t e kn own law . 
Ibid ., p. 346 
Ibid ., p . 33 7 
Ibid. , pp . 35 9-6 0 
Jam e s , Essays in Radical Empiricism , pp . 46 - 52 
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Graham Bird writes that 
James's account of the self is the most obvious illus-
tration of a conjunctive relation, and so of the 
traditional empiricist failure to admit such relations 
among the basic contents of experience. 42 
And if "Knowledge about a thing is knowledge of its rela-
tions.,1143 may we not then say that in this context we 
definitely possess knowledge of self? But in the day-to-day 
business of living life in a world full of people, what 
form does such knowledge take, i.e., which concept of self 
are we most likely to really use? The rath er technical one 
just recounted, or another? I think, another. And it is in 
this light, I believe, that James has provided us with what 
I see as a second account of the self. I refer to this sec-
ond set of supplemental descriptions of the experience of 
44 self, as James' narrative concept of selfhood. And by 
42 Graham Bird, William James: The Arguments of the Phil-
osophers, ed., Ted Honderich (London and New York: 
Rouledge and Kegan Paul, 1986), p. 77 
43 James, Principles, 1, p. 259 
44 Recently, several philosophers have writen on the nar-
rative concept of selfhood. Donald Livingston detects the 
concept of narrative in Hume, in Hume's Philosophy of Com-
mon Life, (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1984), 
pp. 115-149, 247-52. Alasdair MacIntyre, in After Virtue: A 
Study in Moral Theory, 2d ed. (Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre 
Dame Press, 1984), writes that 
Empiricists, such as Locke or Hume, tried to give an 
account of personal identity solely in terms of ps~cho-
logical states or events. Analytical philosophers, in 
so many ways their heirs as well as their critics, have 
wrestled with the connection between those states and 
events and strict idP.ntity understood in terms · of 
Leibniz 's Law . Both have failed to see that a back-
ground has been omitted, the lack of which makes the 
problems insoluble . That background is provided by the 
concept of a story and of that kind of unity of charac-
ter which a story requires. p. 217 
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this, I simply mea n that, for Jam e s, a l arge part of th e 
e xperience of self consists of seeing ourselv e s, a nd how we 
relate to others and the world, in terms of narr a ti ve s. 
To begin, though the narrative conc e pt of s e lf is c e r -
tainly a more general, or informal, perspective on the 
issue, I do not believe that it should therefore be rela-
gated to the status of a Jamesean philosophical 
Charles Taylor, in Sources of the Self: The Making of the 
Modern Identity (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1989), 
writes 
Here we connect up with another inescapable feature 
of human life. I have been arguing that in order to 
make minimal sense of our lives, in order to have an 
identity, we need an orientation to the good, which 
means some sense of qualitative discrimination, of the 
incomparably higher. Now we see that this sense of the 
good has to be woven into my understanding of my life 
as an unfolding story. But this is to state another 
basic condition of making sense of ourselves, that we 
grasp our lives in a narrative .... It has often been 
remarked that making sense of one's life as a story is 
also, like orientation to the good, not an optional 
extra; that our lives exist also in this space of ques-
tions, which only a coherent narrative can answer. In 
order to have a sense of who we are, we have to have a 
notion of how we have become, and of where we are 
going. p. 47 
Barbara Hardy approaches the concept of narrative from the 
more traditional direction of the philosophy of literature, 
in her book Tellers and Listeners: The Narrative Imagina-
tion (London: Athlone Press, 1975) A good example of 
Hardy's view is the following: 
Nature, not art, makes us all story-tellers. Daily and 
nightly we devise fictions and chronicles, calling some 
of them nightmares, some of them truths, records, 
reports, and plans. Some of them we call, or refuse to 
call, lies. Narrative imagination is a common human 
possession, differentiating us, as Isocrates insisted, 
from the animals, and enabling us to 'come together and 
make laws and invent arts.' p. vii 
Eve n so, none of the above authors makes the conn e ction 
b e tw ee n James and this approach. 
3 4 
after-thought . It is significant that when we consider 
James' metaphor of a "stream of thought," we also consider 
that any portion of the stream upon which we may choose to 
focus our attention, can be seen as having a past, present , 
and future: where it has been, where it is now, and where 
it is going. 
Every definite image in the mind is steeped and dyed in 
the free water that flows round it. With it goes the 
sense of its relations, near and remote, the dying echo 
of whence it came to us, the dawning sense of wither it 
is to lead.45 
In this sense, then, we can say that the stream of thought 
itself exhibits a basically narrative form, which is rein-
forced by the fact that every one of its many constituents 
is likewise so constituted. "The tiniest feeling that we 
can possibly have comes with an earlier and a later part 
and with a sense of their continuous procession. 1146 This 
reflection, by both the stream and those parts of it which 
we isolate, of narrative form, is consequently, not an 
option; it is not, for example, artistic and therefore 
artificial or contrived. It is a fact of the human psyche. 
James quotes with approbation from William Clifford's Lec-
tures and Essays. 
45 
46 
No one can tell by examining a piece of gold how often 
it has been melted and cooled in geologic ages, or even 
in the last year by the hand of man. Anyone who cuts 
down an oak can tell by the rings in its trunk how many 
times summer has warmed it into life. A living being 
must always contain within itself the history, not 
James , Principles , 1, p. 255 
James , A Pluralistic Universe, p. 282 
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merely of its own existence , but of all its anc e s -
tors .47 
The very "pulse of inner life," the nucleus of the self , 
displays these self-same characteristics. 
In the pulse of inner life immediately present now in 
each of us is a little past, a little future, a little 
awareness of our own body, of each other's persons, of 
these sublimities we are trying to talk about, of the 
earth's geography and the direction of history, of 
truth and error, of good and bad, and of who knows how 
much more? Feeling, however dimly and subconsciously, 
all these things, your pulse of inner life is contin-
uous with them, belongs to them and they to it. You 
can't identify it with either one of them rather than 
with the others, for if you let it develop into no mat-
ter which of those directions, what it develops into 
will look back on it and say, 'That was the original 
germ of me. ' 4 8 
James does not actually use the phrase "the narrative con-
cept of self," though he does speak of "personal 
histories." 
Within each of our personal histories, subject, object, 
interest and purpose are continuous or may be contin-
uous. Personal histories are processes of change in 
time, and the change itself is one of the things imme-
diately experienced.49 
Other designations which he uses are "aesthetic union," "a 
story," and "life-history." 
Aesthetic union among things also obtains, and is 
very analogous to teleological union. Things tell a 
story. Their parts hang together so as to work out a 
climax .... Retrospectively, we can see that altho no 
definite purpose presided over a chain of events, yet 
the events fell into a dramatic form, with a start, a 
middle, and a finish. In point of fact all stories end 
47 William James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays in 
Popular Philosophy (New York: Longmans Green and Co., 
1897) , p. 231 
48 James , A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 286-87 
49 J a mes , Essays in Radical Empiricism, p. 48 
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... The world is full of partial stories that run paral-
lel to one another , beginning and ending at odd times. 
They mutually interlace and interfere at points , but we 
can not unify them completely in our minds . In follow-
ing your life-history, I must turn my attention from my 
own.SO 
The relation of narrative, i.e., the relation of my past, 
to my present, to my future, is not identical to the rela-
tion of self, but is wholly embraced by it, and is its 
primary orientation. This situation flies in the face of 
most attempts at scientific reductionism, as it is 
extremely difficult to quantify a "biography." 
Psychologically considered, our experiences resist con-
ceptual reduction, and our fields of consciousness, 
taken simply as such, remain just what they appear, 
even though facts of a molecular order should prove to 
be the signals of the appearance. Biography is the con-
crete form in which all that is is immediately given ... 
Men of science and philosophy, the moment they forget 
their theoretic abstractions, live in their biographies 
as much as any one else .... 51 
Let us return for a moment to the distinction which 
James makes between our percepts and concepts. To reiter-
ate, percepts are simply the perceptions of our senses, 
while concepts are the "ideas or representations" 
thereof. 52 In our first acquaintance with this distinction, 
I focused on James' warning that the slavish worship of 
concepts, to the detriment of what is immediately given in 
experience, can result in a dangerous "intellectualism. 1153 
But I now want to also recall James' recommendation to this 
so Willia m James, Pragmatism (Buffalo, New York: 




James , Some Problems of Philosophy, pp. 151-152 
Ibid., p. 4 7 
Ibid. , p. 83 
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e nd : "Use con cep ts when th e y he l p, a nd drop th e m whe n th e y 
hin d e r understanding .... 
1154 Our c o nc e pts of narrative must 
also b e e valuat e d by this injunction. So, h ow do t he y help ? 
J ames as ks us to consider: " I s not th e su m o f your actual 
ex p er i e nce taken at this mome nt and impart ia lly a d ded 
h .. 55 tog e th e r an utter c aos? 
The real world as it is given objectiv e ly at this 
moment is the sum total of all its be i ngs and eve nts 
now. But can we think of such a sum? Can we real i ze f or 
an instant what a cross-section of all existence at a 
definite point of time would be? ... Does the conte mporan-
eity of these events with one another and with a 
million others as disjointed, form a rational bond 
between them, and unite them into anything that means 
for us a world? Yet just such a collateral contemporan-
eity, and nothing else, is the real order of the world. 
It is an order with which we have nothing to do but to 
get away from it as fast as possible.56 
If this is really the case, and it seems so more than 
ever, given the head-long rush of today's technology, any 
aid in helping to organize and deal with the mass of what 
is given, would be welcome. Indeed, it is a psycho-social 
necessity. How is it done? We do it the same way we have 
always done it: "we break it; we break it into histories, 
and we break it into arts, and we break it into sciences; 
57 
and then we begin to feel at home." In the early part of 
the chapter "The Consciousness of Self," in Principles, 
James makes a small concession to reductionism himself, 
whe n he divides the "history" of the self into four 
54 James , Some Probl ems of Philosophy, p. 95 
55 James , Th e Will to Be li e ve, 11 8 p. 
5 6 I bid . , pp . 11 8- 119 
57 I b i d . , p . 1 1 9 
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"constituents:" "The materiel Self; The social Self; The 
spiritual Self; and The pure Ego. 1158 The "material Self" 
has to do with the body, our possessions, and the practical 
aspects of life. The "social Self" is our response to other 
people, and all that that entails. The "spiritual Self" is 
the condition of subjectivity in us all; it is our mental 
lives as revealed to us by both introspection and retro-
spection. The "pure Ego" is the active principle of the 
"spiritual Self" it is the present passing "pulse of 
thought. 1159 The notion of a narrative within a narrative is 
a useful concept here, and it certainly applies to the 
"social Self," of which, as James sees it, there are usu-
ally several coexisting together in one person. 
Practically [there] is a division of the man into sev-
eral selves; and this may be a discordant splitting, as 
where one is afraid to let one set of his acquaintances 
know him as he is elsewhere; or it may be a perfectly 
harmonious division of labor, as where one tender to 
his children is stern to the soldiers or prisoners 
under his command.60 
The nucleus of the self, the present passing thought, is 
the one real seat of personal identity, but the narrative 
of my life has many chapters, many facets. And the one 
which, at any one time, happens to be presented to the 
world, depends upon many factors. I shall discuss the four 
"constituents" of the self more fully in the next chapter. 




James , Principles, 1, p. 292 
Ibid. , pp. 329-30 
Ibid. , p . 294 
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as to why such "b reaks ," or narratives, however many, are 
in use at all . 
As James t ells us, we use concepts to help us sort out 
and make sense of experience . The concept of narrative 
functions likewise. It functions pragmatically, in the 
original sense of that term. By which I mean, narratives 
aid us in the clarification of our ideas about who we are , 
and the actions we should take, given the situation at 
hand. If that situation happens to be the relation of a 
person to his or her future, certain fundamental conditions 
occur, for which the concept of narrative is best fitted 
regarding the subsequently successful resolution thereof. 
This is a stimulus-response situation which James views as 
having basic survival benefits for the individual. We 
should first of all consider that "there is one particular 
relation of greater practical importance than all the rest, 
--I mean the relation of a thing to its future consequen-
ces.1161 James is surprised that "the sense of futurity in 
the mind," given its constancy, has been so little e xplo red 
and written about. 62 Consciousness is seldom if ever with-




But in every novel or unclassified experience ... we do 
not know what will come next; and novelty per se 
becomes a mental irritant, while custom per se is a 
mental sedative, merely because the one baffles while 
the other settles our expectations.63 
James , The Will to Believe , p. 77 
I bid. , p. 77 
I bid. , p. 78 
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The notion of see ing novelty, un ce rt a inty, a nd d oubt as a 
kind o f "me ntal irrit a nt" had previously b ee n in ves t i g a t ed 
by James' friend and colleague Charl e s Sanders Peirce, in 
his important essay "The Fixation of Be lief." 
Doubt is an uneasy and dissatisfied state from which we 
struggle to free ourselves and pass into the state of 
belief; while the latter is a calm and satisfactory 
state which we do not wish to avoid, or to change to a 
belief in anything else .... 
The irritation of doubt causes a struggle to attain 
a state of belief.64 
James responds in a similar manner when he refers to the 
feelings associated with states of belief as "the sentiment 
of rationality." This is described as "A strong feeling of 
ease, peace, rest ... The transition from a state of puzzle 
and perplexity to rational comprehension is full of lively 
65 relief and pleasure." Whether we speak of the products of 
reason or of our "natural beliefs," the feelings involved, 
and their positive effects, are much the same. James gives 
two examples of how "the sentiment of rationality" has been 
achieved in philosophy. "Spinoza ... [effected the] union of 
all things in one substance ... Hume [saw the] ... 'looseness 
64 Charles Sanders Peirce, "The Fixation of Belief'' in The 
Essential Peirce: . Selected Philosophical Writings, Volume7 
(1867-1893) eds., Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana Univ. Press, 1992), 
p. 114 Also of interest should be Alexander Bain's chapter 
on belief in his The Emotions and the Will, 4th ed., (Lon-
don: John W. Parker and Son, 1899), pp. 505-38 These and 
related issues are discussed by Max H. Fisch in his essay 
"Alexand e r Bain and the Genealogy of Pragmatism" in Peirce, 
Semeio tic, and Pragmatism: Essays by Max H. Fisch, e ds., 
Ken n et h Laine Ke tner and Christian J. W. Klo e sel (Blooming -
ton : India na Uni v. Pr e ss, 1986) 
65 James , Th e Will to Be li e ve , p. 63 
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and s e p a rateness ' of everything .. . . 
1166 Two diff e r e nt way s 
of viewing reality , but each creating wi t hin their propo -
nents these same sa lut a ry feelings . On a more practical 
level , these same ef f ects are ac h ieved through our us e of 
n a r rative s. This is a pr a ct i c a l u s e of rea so n b y us which 
we u se t o turn from the irr i t a tion a nd p a i n o f t en gene r ated 
by chaos, doubt, and indecision, to the calmn es s and satis-
faction which we generally associate with order, 
simplicity, and direction. Narratives allow for the crea-
tion and maintenance of habits and customs, without wh ich 
we could neither function nor act. Bain, Peirce, and James 
all stress that what a man or woman believes, they wi ll act 
upon. 6
7 Narratives exemplify belief-systems which help 
initiate and guide our choices and actions, both now and in 
the future. The narrative concept of selfhood is the u nder-
standing of my life as an unfolding story; but as a way of 
structuring experience, it is not entirely the result of my 
own initiative, for, it seems, we can not but respond to 
experience in this manner. For again, "Biography is the 
concrete form in which all that is is immediately 
. .,68 f h given.... I now pass rom t e relation of self, to t h e 
re l at i on of community. 
66 
James , The Will to Be li e v e , p. 67 
67 Bain , The Emo tions an d t he Wi l l , p . 505 ; Peirce, The 
Es se ntial Peirce , p . 114; James , The Will to Be liev e , p. 90 
68 Ja me s , Some Problems of Philosophy , p . 1 51 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE RELATION OF COMMUNITY 
we have come from r e lations, to the relation of self, 
and finally, to the relation of community. We are now in a 
position to address the latter by way of this question: 
What is the status of the community in James' philosophy? 
There are those who say that James has no social phi-
losophy, much less a theory of community. Bruce Kuklick, 
for example, has this to say: 
James and Royce were not social and political thinkers 
of any stature .... Whatever their concern for ethics and 
religion, James and Royce gave little time to social 
and political philosophizing. Their output in these 
areas was slight, their analyses lacked intellectual 
substance, and their applications were conventional and 
often trivial.1 
Ronald Dworkin comments on pragmatism and the community, 
though his remarks are from a much more specific perspec-
tive than Kuklick's. In Law's Empire Dworkin is critical of 
pragmatism as a philosophy of law, and he offers a variety 
of reasons to support his view. One of these is his conten-
tion that "Pragmatism as a conception of law does not 
stipulate which ... visions of a good community are sound or 
attractive."
2 
The implication is that without an under-
s tanding of which notion of a "good community" is best, 
1 
Bruce Kuklick, The Rise of American Philosophy: Cam-
b r idge , Ma s sachusetts, 1860-1930 (New Hav e n: Yale Uni v. 
Press , 1977), pp. 306 - 7 
2 
Ronald Dwor k i n, Law 's Empir e (Cambrid ge : The Belknap 
Press , 1986 ), p . 152 
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pragmatism must also fail in its approach to the laws of 
the community. While this is not meant by Dworkin as a 
direct criticism of James, to the extent that pragmatism is 
seen to figure in a Jamesean account of community, it can 
certainly be taken as such. John McDermott also has mis-
givings, though his final judgement does offer some 
encouragement as regards the task at hand. 
From the outset, we should make it clear that readers 
of the writings of William James are hard put to find a 
doctrine of community therein .... Nonetheless, James's 
version of the individual has much to teach us about a 
doctrine of community, especially as it is worked out 
in the fabric of American life.3 
In what follows, I will proceed in the spirit of 
McDermott's remarks. I agree that James does not provide a 
theory of community in the sense that Marx, Mead, or Dewey 
can be said to have done so. Still, it is my belief that 
what James does have to say on the topic is far from "triv-
ial." McDermott's reference to "James's version of the 
individual" is a point well taken; indeed, Chapter Two's 
treatment of James' concept of the self was a step in that 
direction. I continue in this vein, as promised, by a more 
detailed examination of James' notion of the four constitu-
ents of the self: the material self, the social self, the 
spiritual self, and the pure ego. My plan is to use these 
four characterizations of selfhood as a way of organizing 
James' remarks on community. These remarks, though 
3 
John_J . McDermott, Streams of Experience: Reflections 
on the History and Philosophy of American Culture (Amherst: 
Univ. of Massachusetts Press , 1986), pp. 44-45 
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scattered, hav e a central focus: th e individu a l, and his or 
h e r d e v e lopment. In grouping his obs e rvation s on community 
und e r these four headings this emphasis is recogn i z e d, b ut 
it also recognizes the fact that for James, selfhood is 
always worked out in the midst of a group. So, as we 
explore the relations which hold between these four facets 
of selfhood and the community in which they develop and 
flourish, and as a Jamesean sketch of community begins to 
emerge, it is hoped that it is one which can be seen as 
naturally flowing from his philosophy, rather than as some-
thing artificial and imposed on it. 
To the extent that our thoughts and actions are wholly 
occupied with our physical .body, our immediate family, or 
our possessions, and in as much as these are identified as 
me and mine, we are manifesting that side of ourselves 
which James refers to as the "material self. 114 This reach-
ing out and inclusion of so much that is initially other 




In its widest possible sense ... a man's Self is the sum 
total of all that he CAN call his, not only his body 
and his psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, 
his wife and children, his ancestors and friends, his 
reputation and works, his lands and horses, and yacht 
and bank-account. All these things give him the same 
emotions. If they wax and prosper, he feels triumphant; 
if they dwindle and die away, he feels cast down,--not 
necessarily in the same degree for each thing, but in 
much the same way for all.5 
James, Principles, 1, pp. 292-93 
Ib i d., pp. 291-92 
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The word of emphasis in the above quote is the possessiv e 
pronoun "his." And th e relationship between the material 
self and the community is definitely disjunctive and oppor-
tunistic in nature. We are, for example, often related to 
some members of the community by blood ties, but to most we 
are not so related. To a certain small group of people we 
grant the relation of being a neighbor; to everyone else in 
the community, though, we usually do not. ·My particular tal-
ents and labor skills procure certain benefits for me and 
mine not available to some or many other members of the 
community at large. The perspective is individualistic, and 
the relations to the community are highly selective and 
fewer in number. Such relations are further clarified by 
James in this manner. 
Surely the individual, the person in the singular num-
ber, is the more fundamental phenomenon, and the social 
institution, of whatever grade, is but secondary and 
ministerial. Many as are the interests which social 
systems satisfy, always unsatisfied interests remain 
over, and among them are interests to which system, as 
such, does violence whenever it lays its hand upon us. 
The best Commonwealth will always be the one that most 
cherishes the men who represent the residual interests, 
the one that leaves the largest scope to their peculi-
arities.6 
The individual is fundamental, the social institution is 
secondary and ministerial. The first part of this statement 
is certainly true in a numerical sense, but how so 
6 w·11· J " 1 1am ames, From Thomas Dav idson " in Memories and 
Studies , quoted in The Philosophy of William James: 
Se l e cted From His Chief Works , with an introduction by 
Horace M. Kallen (New York: The Modern Library, n. d.), 
p. 252 
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otherwise? To a n swer th is we must ask ourselves another 
questio n: which is th e more i mpo rtant factor in human char-
acter id ea ls or virtu es ? Or , to pu t it another way , which ' 
is more ess e n t ial, the ideal o f commun i ty , however it may 
b e co n c ei ved, or such human virt ue s as co urage , endurance , 
per s e v e rance, and fidelity? If James must cho o s e , h e 
chooses virtue. 
Now, taken nakedly, abstractly, and immediat e ly, 
you see that mere ideals are the cheapest th i ngs in 
life. Everybody has them in some shape or other, per-
sonal or general, sound or mistaken, lo w or hig h ; a nd 
the most worthless sentimentalists and dreamers, dru nk -
ards, shirks and verse-makers, who never show a grain 
of effort, courage, or endurance, possibly have the m o n 
the most copious scale.7 
From this we should see that no ideal is absolute. An ideal 
is first and foremost a rational construction that provides 
the "outlook, uplift, and brightness that go with all 
intellectual facts. 118 Also, ideals bring a sense of "nov-
elty" to our lives to a degree not generally possible 
without them. 9 And so, given that "ideals are relative to 
the lives that entertain them, 1110 it follows that in this 
narro w sense, community as an ideal is always relative and 
secondary to the individual holding it. James is not ad vo-
cating, of course, that we should toss our ideals out th e 
windo w, or, that they are important in only so me tri vi al 
7 
Will ia m James, Essays on Faith and Mora l s, e d., Ral ph 
Barton Perr y ( New York: Longm a n s , Gr een a nd Company , 1947), 
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se n se . Nor is he si mpl y gl o rifying the will . The individual 
is fundame nt al , bu t f r om J ames ' perspective what is best 
for t h e in d i v idual and indi vi d ua l development is a combina-
t i o n o f both id e als and virtu e s. Jam e s make s this clear in 
t wo passages. 
The significance of a human lif e for co mmuni c ab l e 
and publicly recognizable purposes is thus th e of f -
spring of a marriage of two different parents, e ither 
of whom alone is barren. The ideals taken by th ems elves 
give no reality, the virtues by themselves no no v -
elty.11 
The second passage reinforces the first. 
Ideal aspirations are not enough, when uncombined with 
pluck and will. But neither are pluck and will, dogged 
endurance and insensibility to danger enough, when 
taken all alone. There must be some sort of fusion, 
some chemical combination among these principles, for a 
life objectively and thoroughly significant to 
result.12 
How then, does the social institution of community act 
in ways "ministerial" to the individual? We must first 
realize that while the community can satisfy and provide 
for the interests of many of its members, the interests of 
some, perhaps a sizeable number, will always go unsatis-
fied. Most members of the community will enjoy adequate 
food and shelter, some will not. The school system of the 
community will attempt to respond to and educate our chil -
dr en ; but to those of a cultural minority, or to thos e wi t h 
l e a r ning difficulties, or even to thos e s ee n as gift e d, it 
d o es n ot r e spond so we ll. J a me s opts for "p er so n a l freedom 
1 1 
1 2 
J ames , Ess ay s on Fait h and Mor a ls , p . 305 
Ibid ., p . 3 0 6 
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II 1 3 1 . . th . and its spontaneities.... He g ories in e uniqueness 
of individual differences, and bemoans civilization's gen-
eral response to them. 
[He feels] less unqualifiedly respectful than ever of 
"Civilization," with its herding and branding,licens -
ing and degree-giving, authorizing and appointing, and 
in general regulating and administering by system the 
lives of human beings.14 
James is convinced that the best commonwealth is the one 
which "cherishes" the men and women who represent these 
"residual interests." It is the one which encourages the 
special talents, perspectives, and peculiarities which the 
"system" is unable to satisfy. James makes an observation: 
Why, the very birds of the forest, the parrot, the 
mino, have the power of human speech, but never develop 
it of themselves; some one must be there to teach them. 
So with us individuals.15 
Someone must be there to teach us what we need to know to 
grow. Each of us, teaching someone else, something differ-
ent. And a community is "ministerial" to the degree that it 
encourages and makes possible just such an environment. 
The best commonwealth cherishes those who represent the 
residual interests, but often a community must be pushed 
and goaded in this direction first, before it begins prac-
ticing such principles to an acceptable degree. This being 
the case, the relationship between the individual as mate-
rial self, and the community, will often be exemplified by 
1 3 James, "Thomas Davidson, II p. 2 51 
1 4 Ibid. , 251 -52 pp. 
1 5 Jam es , The Will to Believe, p. 229 
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such attit udes o n t h e part of the member as "tough-minded-
ness ," " stre nu o usn es s," a nd even at times a measure of 
" anarc h y ." Su c h attitud es must be adopted and maintained if 
we ar e to g e t thes e proc e ss e s kick - st arted and r unning . All 
communities, if they h a ve e x ist e d for an y l e ngth of time at 
all, have certain ideals and goals already in p l ace. Hop e-
fully, these are positive; realistically, this is n eve r t he 
case one hundred percent of the time. The proble m is t h a t 
"What the whole community comes to believe in grasps the 
· d' ' d 1 · · 
1116 t· h f 1 in ivi ua as in a vise. Some imes, wen, or examp e, 
the nation finds itself in a state of war, this may well be 
the best state of affairs for both a community and its mem-
bers; at other times though, when a community's ideals and 
goals are slanted toward one particular group, it is not so 
good. In Pragmatism, James contrasts the "tender-minded" 
with the "tough-minded.
1117 On the level of academic philos-
ophy, James views the tender-minded as rationalists, and 
the tough-minded as empiricists; but on the commonsense 
level of daily life, these distinctions simply refer to 
1 8 
"two types of mental make-up," or "temperaments." Of 
course James is interested in making the point that on e 's 
ph i losophical persuasion is not wholly the resul t of in t e l-
l e ctual delib e ration; it also has much to do wi t h a 
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between the material self and the community, tough-mind e d-
ness describes the attitudes and behaviors commonly at 
work. James gives a list of such traits: "S ensationalistic , 
Materialistic, Pessimistic, Irreligious, Fatalistic, Plu-
ralistic, . 1 "
1 9 h b f th . t [and] Scept1ca. Te mem er o e commun1 y 
as material self, and as evidencing such traits as the 
above, is more interested in facts than principles. Spe-
cific situations and occurrences are more important than 
the historical sweep of things. Our success and failure in 
the acquisition of wealth and material possessions, and the 
narrow focus upon me and mine, make us sceptical of what 
the community can and will do. Here, membership in the com-
munity is one of survival of the fittest. And the 
"tough-minded" have the advantage. 
In his essay "The Moral Philosopher and the Moral 
Life," James speaks of "the strenuous mood." 
1 9 
20 
The deepest difference, practically, in the moral 
life of man is the difference between the easy-going 
and the strenuous mood. When in the easy-going mood the 
shrinking from the present ill is our ruling considera-
tion. The strenuous mood, on the contrary, makes us 
quite indifferent to present ill, if only the greater 
ideal be attained. The capacity for the strenuous mood 
probably lies slumbering in every man, but it has more 
difficulty in some than in others in waking up. It 
needs the wilder passions to arouse it, the big fears, 
loves, and indignations; or else the deeply pentrating 
appeal of some one of the higher fidelities, like jus-
tice, truth, or freedom.20 
We should not think that b ecause James speaks of "the 
James, Pragmatism, p. 9 
James , The Will to Believe, p. 211 
51 
I d II mora l li fe ," 'th e str e nuous moo i s a n i n appropriate char-
a ct e ri z ation of the material self's r es p onse t o c ommunity 
life. Myers points this out. 
He supposed that his social and political convictions 
were rooted in his ethical beliefs .... James b e li eve d 
that morality, politics, and normative sociology are 
interrelated .... 21 
Much of the time, perhaps most of the time, moral relations 
and social relations are not the clearly distinct catego-
ries which some philosophers, sociologists, and politicians 
would like for them to be. It is James' position . that more 
often than not, they flow one into the other, or are woven 
together into strands difficult or impossible to separate. 
What is needed is "a pretext for living hard, and getting 
out of the game of existence its keenest possibilities of 
22 zest." As indicated, a "pretext" can take the form of 
"big fears, loves, and indignations," or, an ideal such as 
"justice, truth, or freedom." Any of these can serve as a 
"pretext," but it seems more likely that the former, rather 
than the latter, would serve as the genesis for the "stren-
uous mood" as far as the material self is concerned. 
Certainly such community-based relations as employment, 
unemployment, wealth, and debt are quite able to generate 
such strong emotions. James saw evidence of the "strenuous 
mood" in operation as turn-of-the-century labor attempted 
21 
Ge rald E. Myers, William James: His 
( New Hav e n: Yale Univ. Press, 1986), p. 
22 
J ames , Th e Will to Be liev e , p. 213 
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to organize and improve the lot of the common worker. And 
he welcomed it. James, always the champion of the common 
man and underdog, nevertheless implores both rich and poor 
to attempt to see things from the other's perspective.
23 
His final conclusion on the matter is this observation: 
Society has, with all this, undoubtedly got to pass 
toward some newer and better equilibrium, and the dis-
tribution of wealth has doubtless slowly got to change: 
such changes have always happened, and will happen to 
the end of time .... The solid meaning of life is always 
the same eternal thing,--the marriage, namely, of some 
unhabitual ideal, however special, with some fidelity, 
courage, and endurance; with some man's or woman's 
pains.--And, whatever or wherever life may be, there 
will always be the chance for that marriage to take 
place.24 
The whole point of tough-mindedness and strenuousness, 
whether we are attempting to get what we see as our fair 
share from the community, or in any other area of life, is 
the realization that--at least as far as James is con-
cerned--the lion's share of the meaning of life, and the 
excitement and joy of life, has to do more with the striv-
25 ing than the attaining of our goals. 
James' advocacy of anarchism is not the anarchism of 




James, Essays on Faith and Morals, pp. 307-9 
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Strenuousness is a common theme in James' writings. 
Here ~re two more examples: The Varieties of Religious 
E~perience : A Study in Human Nature (New York: The Modern 
L~bra;.y ~ n. d.), p. 359; "The Absolute and the Strenuous 
Life , in The Meaning of Truth, eds., Fredson Bowers and 
Ig?as K. Skrupskelis , introduction by H. S. Thayer (Cam-
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53 
the civic habit "of fierce and merciless resentment toward 
26 
every man or set of men who break the public peace." 
Jam es admitted to being an anarchist himself on at least 
two occasions. In a letter to his friend William Dean 
Howells, he writes "I am becoming more an individualist and 
· " 2 7 Wh · 1 . P t . . t . th anarchist.... i e in ragma ism, in commen ing on e 
writer Morrison I. Swift, he writes that "Mr. Swift's anar-
chism goes a little farther than mine does .... 1128 James' 
version of anarchism has been described as a "polite anar-
chism," and as "anarchist communalism. 1129 Individual 
freedom and individual rights are not only extremely impor-
tant to that mode of community life characterized by 
reference to the material self, they are important to all 
modes of community life. James thinks the best way to 
encourage and maintain these ideals is first of all to move 
away from the tendency toward increase and bigness which 
seems to be the fate of most communities, and move instead, 
in the opposite direction. Hence, the description "anar-
chist communalism." 
26 
[he encourages] lovers of the ideal [of freedom] to 
found smaller communities ... through small systems, kept 
pure, lies one most promising line of betterment and 
James, "Robert Gould Shaw," in Memories and Studies, 
quoted in The Philosophy of William James, p. 315 
27 
William James to William Dean Howells, 16 November 
1900, "Howells Papers," quoted in William James, Public 
Philosopher, George Catkin (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins 
Univ. Press, 1990), p. 174 
28 
James, Pragmatism, p. 16 
29 
Catkin, William James, Public Philosopher , pp. 174-175 
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salvation. Why won't anarchists get together and try 
it . I am too ill ( and too old!) or I might chip in 
myself.30 
Sentiments such as these were doubtless at work in James' 
initial evaluation of the experimental community of 
Chautauqua: a "middle-class paradise, without a sin, with-
31 
out a victim, without a blot, without a tear." He "stayed 
for a week, [and was] held spell-bound by the charm and 
ease of everything, 1132 but upon leaving, he was astonished 
to find himself relieved. So much here was right; but some-
thing vitally important was missing. What was it? It wa s 
"the element of precipitousness, so to call it, of strength 
33 and strenuousness, intensity and danger." Jamesean anar-
chism, again, is not a license for physical violence and 
the wholesale toppling of governments--although James 
always thinks it proper and our duty to fight political 
corruption whenever it is detected. It is, rather, another 
opportunity to practice and celebrate the tough-mindedness 
and strenuousness which he sees as indispensable to both 
the individual and the community's growth, development, and 
prosperity. To a great extent, to grow, develop, and pros-
per, is to change; but whether it is the individual member 
of the community, a group within the community, or the com-
munity at large, there must first of all be a willingness 
30 
James to Ernest Howard Crosby, 23 October 1901, in 
Selected Unpublished Correspondence, quoted in William 
James, Public Philosopher, p. 174 
31 
James , Essays on Faith and Morals, p. 288 
32 Ibid ., p. 288 
3 3 Ibid., p. 289 
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to try something new, or to do something diff ere ntly. This 
is the message behind James' emphasis of the attitudes of 
tough-mindedness and strenuousness, and of thos e actions 
and behaviors exemplified by James' "polite anarchism." 
Chautauqua was guilty of too thoroughly r e sting upon its 
laurels; of not continuing to experiment and progress. And 
this he sees as negating those very sentiments and ideals 
which brought it into being in the first place. 
Those conditions and episodes of community life which I 
have been discussing under the general heading of the 
material self, have tended to emphasize disjunctive rela-
tions rather than conjunctive relations. We should remember 
that for James and radical empiricism, this was exactly 
classical empiricism's great mistake. It is James' doctrine 
of relations which attempts to redress this imbalance, and 
give each side of the equation of human experience its just 
due. In one context, such as the present one, disjunctive 
relations are important. In another context, conjunctive 
relations are in the fore-front. And both are usually pre-
sent to some degree whatever the context. The importance of 
this to the present situation is this: the difference and 
novelty exhibited by various members of the community 
should not be rejected out-of-hand by the community as 
either unimportant and trivial on the one side, nor as 
something dangerous and to be feared on the other. Such 
po te ntially disjunctive relations as race, religion, mon e -
tar y worth, or physical handicap, should b e see n and 
5 6 
emb r aced as necessary ingredients to a healthy community. 
James sums this up beautifully when he says "The commun i ty 
stagnates without the impulse of the individual. The 
impulse dies away without the sympathy of the community.
1134 
I turn now to those features of the community best 
described by reference to the social self, and James offers 
this definition: "A man's Social Self is the recognition 
which he gets from his mates. 1135 He goes on to tell us that 
we are "gregarious animals," and that "we have an innate 
propensity to get ourselves noticed, and noticed favorably, 
by our kind. 1136 What does this suggest to us about the com-
munity? It suggests, first of all, that a great part of who 
we are and what we are is the result of the relations which 
hold between ourselves and others. Secondly, there is an 
"innate propensity" at work here: it is the need for people 
and for the community which makes adequate numbers of them 
available to us for such purposes as these situations 
require. Third, the community, therefore, has not so much 
come into being throughout the history of man by choice, as 
by need. Certainly, decisions are made, and communities of 
various sizes and purposes come into being all the time, as 
James' own so-called "anarchist communalism" might suggest. 
Fundamentally, though, they exist because we need them. 
The importance of the influence which certain members 
3 4 Ja me s, Th e Will to Beli e ve, p. 232 
35 Ja mes , Pr inciples, 1 ' p. 293 
36 Ibid . , 293 p. 
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and groups of the community have upon us, is reinforced by 
a reference which James makes to John Locke.
37 
In An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding, Locke speaks of a "moral 
relation ." It "is the conformity or disagreement men's vol-
38 untary actions have to a rule .... " There are three sorts 
of rules or laws: "the divine law, the civil law, and the 
law of opinion or reputation. 1139 Many break God's laws, 
always supposing that they will ask for forgiveness at a 
later date. Those who break the laws of the land, do so 
thinking it unlikely they will ever be punished. The situa-
tion is completely different, though, as regards "this law 
of fashion," as Locke also refers to the third type of 
40 law. 
But no man escapes the punishment of their censure and 
dislike, who offends against the fashion and opinion of 
the company he keeps, and would recommend himself to. 
Nor is there one of ten thousand, who is stiff and 
insensible enough, to bear up under the constant dis-
like and condemnation of his own club .... nobody that 
has the least thought or sense of a man about him, can 
live in society under the constant dislike and ill 
opinion of his familiars, and those he converses 
with.41 
In this, James concurs. 
37 
38 
No more fiendish punishment could be devised, were such 
a thing physically possible, than that one should be 
James, Principles, 1, p. 293 
John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 
2 vols , edited and with an introduction by Alexander 
Campbell Fraser (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1959), 
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turned loo se in s oci e ty a nd r e mai n a b solutely unnoticed 
b y a ll th e membe rs th e r e of.42 
The mate r ia l se lf's f o cu s i s on me a nd mine . The social 
sel f's focus is on what oth e rs think a bout me and mine . 
Human n a ture being wha t it is, no c ommunity will survive 
for long without some laws and rules. This is a co mmon-
pl a ce, whatever else one's scheme of community may e nt a il. 
What James, and Locke before him, wish to call our atten-
tion to, is that the real driving force of community life 
is not so much our relation to its laws and rules--impor-
tant as this may be--as it is our relation to its other 
members. The true extent of James' commitment to this view 
is shown when he tells us that "Everything we know and are 
43 is through men." Granted, the laws and rules of the com-
munity are the products of men and women. Even so, it is 
the actual relations between people that James is inter-
ested in here, not those between people and their 
rationalistic constructions. 
Our relationships with people take the form of a "net-




There are innumerable kinds of connection that sp e -
cial things have with other special things; and the 
ensemble of any one of these connections for ms one so r t 
of system by which things are conjo i ned. Thus men are 
co n jo i ned in a vast network of acquainta nce ship. Bro wn 
k no ws Jones, Jones knows Robinson, etc., a nd _Qy 
James , Prin c ip l e s, 1, p. 293 
James to Thomas W. Ward, in The Le t ters of William 
James , quoted in The Ph ilosophy of William James, p . 249 
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choosing your farther intermediaries rightly you may 
carry a message from Jones to the Empress of China , or 
the Chief of the African Pigmies, or to any one else in 
the inhabited world. But you are stopped short, as by a 
non-conductor, when you choose one man wrong in this 
experiment .44 
There are many "ensemble[s]," many "syst e m[s]," one of 
which is the community. As we have seen, one important 
example--perhaps the most important example, as far as the 
community is concerned--of the "connections" between peo-
ple, consists of their opinion of each other. James goes so 
far as to say that a man 
has as many different social selves as there are dis-
tinct groups of persons about whose opinion he cares. 
He generally shows a different side of himself to each 
of these different groups.45 
Opinion can take the form of the conjunctive relation of 
approval, or the disjunctive relation of disapproval. Opin-
ion is constantly bringing people together, and at the sa me 
time driving them apart. As both Locke and James observe, 
such relations can exert a force so strong, that in certain 
instances we come to see them as a form of punishment as 
severe as almost any which the law itself could prescribe. 
44 James, Pragmatism, pp. 60-61. The concept of social 
networks has been a fruitful one since the time of James. 
Here are several important sources: J. A. Barnes, "Class 
and Committies in a Norwegian Island Parish," Human Rela-
tions 7, (1954): pp. 39-58; Barnes, "Social Networks," An 
Addison-Wesley Module in Anthropology 26 (United Statesof 
America: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., Inc., 1972) 
pp. 1-29; Elizabeth Bott, Family and Social Networks (Lon -
don: Tavistock Publications, 1957); Bott, "Family Kinship 
and Marriage " in Man in Society: Patterns of Human Organi-
zation, eds. , Douglas, Mary et al (London: Macdonald, 
1962). 
45 
James , Principles , 1, p. 294 
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We e xp e rience the relations which conn e ct th e members of 
of the community as being just as real as our ex p erie nc e o f 
the members themselves. 
the relations between things, conjunctive as we ll as 
disjunctive, are just as much matters of dir e ct pa rt i c -
ular experience, neither more so nor less so, th a n th e 
things themselves .... the parts of experienc e hold 
together from next to next by relations that are t hem -
selves parts of experience.46 
We saw in Chapter Two how the experience of the conjunctiv e 
relation of self was one which was felt. This is equally 
the case with the conjunctive relation of community. The 
experience of community is one which is felt. "Through 
feelings we become acquainted with things ... Feelings are 
the germ and starting point of cognition, thoughts the 
47 
developed tree." Whether we see the community as a "sys-
tem, or as a "network of acquaintanceship," we either 
"feel" ourselves to be a part of it, or we do not. If we do 
not, it may be the result of too many "non-conductor[s]." 
We have seen that a "non-conductor" can be a person, or the 
opinion of a person important to us in some way. I suspect, 
though, that James would agree that a "non-conductor" could 
take many forms, e.g., emotions like hate or fear, charac-
ter traits such as avarice or cruelty, or a rule or law 
which singles out certain racial, social, political, or 
religious groups. All these, and more, cause the alienation 
4 6 Jame s, The Meaning of Tr uth, p. 7 
4 7 
James , Pri nc ipl e s, 1, p. 222. Fo r more on the general 
distinction wh ic h J ames mak e s be tw ee n " knowledge of 
acquaintance and knowledge-abou t," see pp . 22 1-23 . 
6 1 
which so many seem to feel in today's communities. It is 
much like depriving a certain area or organ of the body of 
oxygen and nourishment. It can occur for short periods of 
time without too many ill effects; longer periods, though, 
can cause great damage. This suggestion is in line with 
James' declaration that "A community is a living 
h . 1148 d t · . ·t h . 1 ting... as oppose o viewing i as a mec anica 
device. James does not want to stretch the analogy of the 
community as an organism too far. He does not see the con-
cept of organism as an all-eneveloping metaphysical 
principle of human society. Still, it is a useful one when 
applied in a more modest fashion. It underlines James' con-
tention that a social unit such as the community, unlike a 
machine, is not built up or put together from disconnected 
bits and pieces; it is a natural growth. Just as James 
views consciousness as unable to arise from the simple com-
pounding of isolated mental elements, the community, as a 




Everything that exists is influenced in some way by 
something else, if you can only pick the way out 
rightly. Loosely speaking, and in general, it may be 
said that all things cohere and adhere to each other 
somehow, and that the universe exists practically in 
reticulated and concatenated forms which make of it a 
continuous or 'integrated' affair.49 
James is not promoting absolute unity in all spheres of 
James, The Will to Believe, p. 230 
James, Pragmatism, p. 61 
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human consciousness and activity, much less th e community. 
His lecture "The One and the Many" in Pragmatism is an 
attempt to show that what we actually find in experi e nce 
are many kinds of unity, not just one. Even so, it may 
appear that James' theory of relations does in fact point 
in the direction of some type of monism, or, in this case, 
toward the possibility of some one "best theory of commu-
nity." This is definitely not James' intention. 50 As far as 
a "theory" of community is concerned, James offers only the 
barest sketch. What he is interested in, though, is the 
"experience" of community, and its relation to other 
aspects of experience in general. Throughout it all, it is 
not "absolute unity" which is revealed--either in the com-
munity itself, or between it and some other social entity--
but continuity. This is an example of why James categorizes 
his philosophy as a "philosophy of pluralism with continu-
l:_ly.1151 And this approach is of the greatest practical 
importance to life in the community as we strive to enter 
into what James refers to as a "real relation 1152 with 
others. What such a relationship entails, and how it is 
50 
James fought against all forms of monism in philosophy. 
He saw no possibility for an "absolutely final" theory of 
anything, including the community. One example of his oppo-
sition to monism is his essay "On Some Hegelisms," in The 
Will to Believe, pp. 263-98. --
51 
James, MS (Houghton Library), "Hegelianism," quoted in 
William James, by Bernard P. Brennan, Twayne's United 
Stat e s Authors Series, ed., Sylvia E. Bowman (New Yor k: 
Twa yn e Publishers, Inc., 1968), p. 129 
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important to the community, I will now discuss in conjunc -
tion with the "spiritual self." 
By the Spiritual Self, so far as it belongs to the 
Empirical Me, I mean a man's inner or subjective being, 
his psychic faculties or dispositions, taken concretely 
.... our ability to argue and discriminate ... our moral 
sensibility and conscience ... our indomitable will .... 53 
As we can see, this third constituent of selfhood covers a 
lot of ground, and, James informs us, may be considered 
from a variety of viewpoints. I will not enumerate all of 
James' examples; for our purposes here, I will concentrate 
on certain things which James has to say regarding "our 
moral sensibility and conscience." 
To begin with, I do not believe James' use of the term 
"spiritual" is meant to be taken in a religious sense; 
instead, he is making the simple distinction that selfhood 
has both a physical and non-physical side. Likewise, our 
response to the community can be self-centered and materi-
alistic--as in the case with the material self--or it can 
focus on other members and how we feel about them, which, 
in this context, I see the "spiritual self" as exemplify-
ing. This connection between our sentiments and "our moral 
sensibility and conscience" was briefly alluded to in both 
Chapter One and Two. It refers to both Hume's and James' 
conviction that morality is based upon sentiment, rather 
than reason. In like fashion, the moral relations which 
exist between ourselves and others can not be based solely 
53 
Ja me s, Principles, 1, p. 296 
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upon either the rule of law, or a rationalistic th e ory of 
community. It must also entail something which is felt. 
This is the beginning of what James means by entering into 
a "real relation" with another. And that which is felt is 
sympathy; although, it is not sympathy as a species of 
pity, but as a form of communication. 
We long for sympathy, for a purely personal commu-
nication, first with the soul of the world, and then 
with the soul of our fellows. And happy are they who 
think, or know, that they have got them154 
James is not the first to make the connection between 
th d · t · 
55 H h d d . th T sympa y an communica ion. ume a one so in e rea-
tise. Hume writes: 
No quality of human nature is more remarkable, both 
in itself and in its consequences, than that propensity 
we have to sympathize with others, and to receive by 
communication their inclinations and sentiments, how-
ever different from, or even contrary to our own .... 56 
Hatred, resentment, esteem, love, courage, mirth and 
melancholy; all these passions I feel more from commu-
nication than from my own natural temper and 
disposition.57 
From the perspective of the "theory of ideas," "In sympathy 
there is an evident conversion of an idea into an impres-
sion.1158 Ideas we have of others get associated with ideas 
we have of ourselves. We feel strongly about ourselves, and 
54 James to Thomas w. Ward, 
James, pp. 248-49 
in The Philosophy of William 
55 
Alex~nder Bain's account of sympathy in chapter 6 of 
The Emotions and the Will (1859), is an earlier treatment 
which, along with James', also draws from Hume. Bain's ver-
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begin t o fee l lik e wise about oth ers . Wh at is really impor-
t a nt her e , is not Hume's associationist p s ychol o g y; it is 
his ob servation that sympathy is a proc es s o f c ommunica-
t i on. And wh e n communication occurs, a deg r e e of 
understanding come s into being which was not th ere b e f o r e . 
James go e s so far as to say that in showing symp a t hy we 
have 
added to the property of the race, even if no one k no ws 
your name, yet it is certain that, without what y ou 
have done, some individuals must needs be acting now i n 
a somewhat differant manner. You have modified their 
life; you are in real relation with them; you have in 
so far forth entered into their being.59 
I believe what James is suggesting is that to enter into a 
"real relation" with another is to enter into a "moral 
relation" with another. And it is sympathy, more than any 
other relation, which offers us the greatest possible impe-
tus to treat people in morally responsible ways. The li n k 
between sympathy and morality is made by James in the fol-
lowing passage. 
59 
It seems to me that a sympathy with men as such, and a 
desire to contribute to the weal of a species, which, 
whatever may be said of it, contains All that we 
acknowledge as good, may very well form an external 
interest sufficient to keep one's moral pot boiling in 
a very lively manner to a good old age.60 
What makes a community? What makes a nation? Th ere ha v e 
Ja mes to Thomas W. Ward, in The Philosophy o f Will i a m 
James , p. 249 
60 Ibi d., p. 2 50. 
and rela t ed iss u es 
Beings ," and "What 
Faith and Morals . 
Two e ssays also d e al in g wi th sympathy 
a r e "on a Certai n Bli ndness in Human 
Makes a Life Significant?" in Essays 
66 
on 
b ee n a s many exa mpl es cit e d i n th is re g ard , as th e r e h a v e 
been wr it e rs int e rest e d in th e s e ques tion s .
6 1 
One thing , at 
l eas t, s ee ms fund a mental. The me mbe rs of a co mmunity , and 
the ci t ize ns of a nation, fee l a sympa t h y f or each other 
t h at th e y do not f ee l towa r d those in oth er c o mmun i t ie s or 
o th e r nations. This is what James is gett i ng at when he 
r e marks that "Every nation has ideals and diffic u lt ie s and 
sentiments which are an impenetrable secret to one no t of 
62 the blood." Though sympathy at this level e x ists al most 
in spite of what we say or do, its importance to the con -
tinued e x istence of all social groups regardless of t h eir 
size, can not be over-emphasized. At the same time, the 
sympathy at work in a "real relation" is much more intense. 
It requires a degree of commitment to others which most of 
us, under normal conditions, are unwilling to e x tend to a 
group the size of a nation or larger. James speaks of 
entering into the being of another. At least as regards a 
group the size of the community, this is, perhaps, a goal 
61 G. A. Hillery Jr. cites 94 definitions of commu n ity i n 
his paper "Definitions of Community: Areas of Agreement," 
Rural Sociology, 20, (1955), quoted in Community Studies: 
An Introduction to the Sociology of the Local Commun i ty, 
Colin Bell and Howard Newby (New York: Praeger Publishers, 
1972), pp. 27-29. 
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James to Mrs. Henry Whitman, in The Letters of William 
Ja me s, quoted in The Philosophy of William James, p. 25 3. 
Hume al so makes th i s point: 
To this principle we ought to ascribe the g re at uni-
formi ty we may observ e in the humours and tur n of 
thinkin g of t h os e of the same n a t i on; a nd ' tis much 
more probable , t ha t t his resemblance ar i ses from sym-
pathy , than from a n y influ e n ce of th e soil and climate, 
which , tho ' they conti nue invariably the same, are not 
a bl e to preserve the charact e r of a nati o n th e sam e for 
a ce ntury togeth e r . Treatise , p. 317 
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not beyond the reach of most of us if we can begin to 
become "more livingly aware ... of the depths of worth that 
] i li lives.
1163 Again, lie around ... [us], hid[den n a en 
II a 
community is a living thing," but we should not allow it to 
become a beast which swallows up the individual. And sym-
pathy as a process of communication is, for James, our best 
defense against just such an occurrence. 
The last of the four constituents of the self is the 
"pure ego." This is the "pure principle of personal iden-
tity,1164 and it was the focus of Chapter Two of the present 
work; so, with respect to our current considerations, 
instead of personal identity, I will discuss the identity 
of a Jamesean community. 
The identity of a Jamesean community is not the result 
of some one theory of community. It has to do with the 
63 James, Essays on Faith and Morals, p. 307. Charles 
Horton Cooley (1864-1929) was one of America's leading 
sociologists. He was an admirer of James, and sought to 
develop several of James' insights from a sociological per-
spective. James' notion of sympathy as communication, is 
one of them. 
It [sympathy] denotes the sharing of any mental state 
that can be communicated, and has not the special 
implication of pity or other "tender emotion" that it 
commonly carries in ordinary speech. This emotionally 
colorless usage is, however, perfectly legitimate, and 
is, I think, more common in classical English litera-
ture than any other. Human Nature and the Social Order, 
(New York: Charles Scribners's Sons, 1922), pp. 136-137 
For more on the James-Cooley connection, see The Two Major 
Works of Charles H. Cooley: Social Organization; Human 
Nature and the Social Order, introduction by Robert Cooley 
Angell (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1956), p. xii. 
Also, ~e wi~ A. ~oser, Masters of Sociological Thought: 
I d e as in Historical and Social Context (New York: Harcourt 
Bra c e Jov a novich, Inc., 1971 ), p. 305 
64 J a mes , Principles, 1, p. 330 
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practice of sympat hy in the afore-mentioned sense; but it 
is also a special orientation, and this is an orientation 
which is pragmatic in nature. James describes it in th e 
following manner. 
No particular results then, but only an attitude of 
orientation, is what the pragmatic method means. The 
attitude of looking away from first things, principles, 
"categories," supposed necessities; and of looking 
towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts.65 
Significantly, James places this "attitude of orientation" 
squarely within the social realm when he speaks of it as "a 
66 corridor in a hotel." Many rooms open out of this corri-
dor. In each one we find someone with a different perspec-
tive, doing things differently. No one person owns the 
corridor. It belongs to all. Still, it is the most practi-
cal way for everyone to get to, and leave their rooms. This 
does not mean, of course, that this is the "only" way of 
access and departure. If the hotel catches fire, occupants 
may well find themselves leaving by way of the windows, 
climbing down fire-truck ladders. What is important, here, 
is that the pragmatic community evaluates situations and 
options by their practical consequences first, before it 
does so in light of someone's political agenda. The prag-
matic community realizes, for example, that no amount of 
theorizing, planning, or wishing, in and of itself, is ever 
going to decrease injustice and outright evil within the 
65 
66 
James , Pragmatism, p. 27 
Ibid. , p. 27 
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community to any appreciable degr e e. Havin g made a pl a n, a 
community must then have the courage to take action a nd put 
it to the test. 
The way of escape from evil ... is not by g e tting it 
"aufgehoben," or preserved in the whole as an el eme nt 
essential but "overcome." It is by dropping it out 
altogether, throwing it overboard and getting b e yond 
it, helping to make a universe that shall forg e t its 
very place and name.67 
James does not hesitate to apply this pragmatic orien-
tation to the various social issues of his own day. It is 
not a systematic attempt, but it is illustrative of how 
both individuals and communities large and small can pro-
ceed. Let us look at several brief examples. 
I have already introduced James' notion of sympat h y as 
an indispensable condition of the life of any community 
actually committed to the well-being of its members. I will 
further enlarge upon the connection between sympathy, 
alienation, and the pragmatic community by noting that 
alienation in some form has no doubt been a part of commu-
nity life from earliest times; but that does not 
necessarily mean that -we are powerless to do anything about 
it. James relates his own sense of alienation regarding his 
visits to New York City. For 20 years no visit had lasted 
longer than 36 hours. On each occasion he had felt out-of-
touch and repulsed by it all. During one visit, t h ough, hi s 
stay was long e r. He was abl e to mee t p e opl e , move arou nd, 
and ex pe ri e n ce f i r st - h a nd th e actu a l wor kings of the great 
67 
J a me s , Pragmatism , p . 130 
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ci ty. His ch a nge of attitud e was imme diat e : " I ' m sure that 
onc e i n that movement, and at home, all oth e r pl a c e s wou ld 
s ee m insipid. 1168 If, as McDermott observes, "For J a mes , 
, 116 9 
ali e na tion is the inability to make r e lati o ns, we can 
see that this was certainly what had occurr e d in J a me s' 
case. And thus, the alienation of 20 years was resolv e d 
when James began to "make relations," or, to be at "once in 
that movement, and at home." Obviously James had previous 
knowledge of New York City and its inhabitants. But the 
relation of knowledge alone was not enough. Other conjunc-
tive relations were also needed. James had to take action 
and get involved before the entire process of resolution 
could get fully under way. The pragmatic implication for 
the community is that to make connections with others, is a 
simple yet significant beginning to the overcoming of 
alienation. Relations, coupled with a pragmatic orienta~ · 
tion, are powerful tools in the community's efforts to 
enhance the quality of life of its members. James is led to 
remark 
68 
[that] The world stands really malleable, waiting to 
receive its final touches at our hands. Like the king-
dom of heaven, it suffers human violence willingly. Man 
James to Henry James, 1907, in The Letters of William 
James, quoted in The Philosophy of William James, p. 294 
69 · McDe rmott, Streams of ExRerience, p. 105. Travelling 
through th e mountains of North Carolina, J a mes had a s im i-
lar ex p e r ie nce. There too, he recounts, he had f e l t 
out-of-to uch and "blind" to th e lives of the ar e a's i nhabi-
tants. When h e ~ade a n e ffort to learn a bout th e peop l e , 
and some of their hopes a nd dr ea ms, his p r e v ious views 
c h a ng e d . Essa son Fait h a na Mor al s , pp . 26 1-62 . 
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't 70 engen d e rs truths upon 1 • 
I n his e ssay "The Moral Equival e nt of Wa r," James sug-
ges ts how the pragmatic community might r espon d t o ce r tain 
iss u e s r e garding young peopl e . He not e s th a t " There is 
som e thing highly parado x ical in the mod e rn ma n's rela ti on 
to war. 1171 We deplore the brutality, bloodsh e d, and wa st e ; 
yet we admire the heroism, discipline, and sacrific e wh ich 
the young men and women who fight our wars so oft e n dis -
play. James asks if it would not be possible to instill 
such ideals, and other beneficial habits of conduct, in the 
hearts and minds of the community's youth without the 
necessity of going to war. James' idea is 
instead of a military conscription a conscription of 
the whole youthful population to form for a certain 
number of years a part of the army enlisted against 
Nature ... [James is convinced] numerous ... goods to the 
commonwealth would follow.72 
In other words, perhaps by getting our youth involved in 
various public service projects, character would be built 
while communities and the nation receive other more practi-
cal benefits as well. And history shows--particularly 
during President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's adminiatra-
tion--that projects like this were actually tried with 
varying degrees of success. 
James also applies the pragmatic outlook to the 
70 James , Pr agmat i sm, pp. 112-113 
71 James , Ess a ys on Fa i th and Mo r al s , p. 3 11 
72 Ibid . , p . 325 
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Values. First' as he makes clear in "The question of group 
Moral Philosopher and the Moral Lif e " 
the words 'good, ' 'bad, ' and 'obligation' ... mean no 
absolute natures, indep e ndent of p e rsonal support. They 
are objects of feeling and desire, which have no foot-
hold or anchorage in Being, apart from the existence of 
actually living minds.73 
In a hypothetical universe of one person, then, 
So far as he feels anything to be good, he makes it 
good. It is good, for him; and being good for him, is 
absolutelygood, for he is the sole creator of values 
in that universe, and outside of his opinion things 
have no moral character at all.74 
Even so, while upon such a person there could be "no out-
ward obligation," the relationship of past judgements to 
present ones would still constitute an inward obligation. 
And some scale of values would have to be devised for such 
75 an individual to remain completely happy. 
When we begin speaking of great numbers of people, the 
situation becomes much more complex, but the solution is 
much the same. It is still the case "that without a claim 
actually made by some concrete person there can be no obli-
gation .... 1176 But how are we to decide which claims are 
important and which are trivial? In this case, too, a scale 
of values is needed if we are to avoid confusion and inevi-
table conflict. Given that the study of value has been a 
special province of philosophy for several thousand years, 
one might assume that the philosopher is therefore best 
73 James, Essays Faith and Mora ls, on p. 197 
74 Ibid ., 190-191 pp . 
75 Ibid. , 1 91 p. 
76 Ibid. , 194 p. 
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fitted for the construction of this "casui stic scale." But 
something far greater has beat the philosopher to the 
punch -- human experience! 
So far then, and up to date, the casuistic scale is 
made for the philosopher already far better than he can 
ever make it for himself. An experiment of the most 
searching kind has proved that the laws and usages of 
the land are what yield the maximum of satisfaction to 
the thinkers taken all together. The presumption in 
cases of conflict must always be in favor of the con-
ventionally recognized good.77 
The community itself has provided the answer, and it is one 
arrived at by pragmatic means. Still, James is not recom-
mending that the philosopher should abandon all efforts in 
this regard; only that his results are to be evaluated in 
the same manner as everyone else's: in the gristmill of 
experience. Thus, he offers to the philosopher these sug-
gestions: 
The philosopher must be a conservative, and in the con-
struction of his casuistic scale must put the things 
most in accordance with the customs of the community on 
top .... if he be a true philosopher he must see that 
there is nothing final in any actually given equilib-
rium of human ideals .... [Also,] the philosopher must 
allow that it is at all times open to any one to make 
the experiment, provided he fear not to stake his life 
and character upon the throw.78 
In a sense, then, Dworkin is correct. Whether we are 
speaking of a pragmatic conception of law, or pragmatism 
generally, neither will stipulate absolutely which "visions 
of a good community are sound or attractive." Their vision 
of a good community is always o · th k' ne in e ma 1ng, constantly 
77 
78 
James, Essays on Faith and Morals, p. 206 
Ibid., p. 206 
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reinv e nting itself, sometimes slowly, someti mes q u i ck ~y. Th e 
truly pragmatic community draws from the past, liv e s in t h e 
h for the future. All of this reinforc e s pres e nt, and opes 
my contention that James has little inter e st i n constr uc-
ting a "theory" of community; but he is quite interest e d i n 
the exploration of our "experience" of community. I shall 
close this chapter with a reference to a philosopher con-
sidered by many to be the pragmatic community's most severe 
critic: Bertrand Russell. 
In his essay "Pragmatism," Russell describes the prag-
matic community in the following manner: 
if pragmatism were the accepted creed, public opinion 
would have to be guided by the interests of the commu-
nity. To this there would be no objection if, as would 
be commonly done, the maintenance of justice could be 
taken as one of the ends which it is in the interest of 
the community to pursue. But in a pragmatist community 
this would be impossible, since justice is derivative 
from the interests of the community, and not an inde-
pendent constituent of those interests .... In the 
absence of any standard of truth other than success, it 
seems evident that the familiar methods of the struggle 
for existence must be applied to the elucidation of 
difficult questions, and that ironclads and Maxim guns 
must be the ultimate arbiters of metaphysical truth.79 
According to Russell, then, the pragmatic community suffers 
from a dangerous epistemological bias: there are no stand-
ards of truth, because truth is simply whatever works in a 
given situation. 
Fundamentally, Russell wants to say that the pragmatic 
t h e ory of truth is not a theory of the meaning of truth; it 
79 
Bertra nd Ru ssel l, Philoso phi c al Es s ays (New Yor k : Simon 
and Schuste r, 1966 ), p. 10 9 
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is a psychological theory concerning our b e li e fs a bo u t what 
is true. The pragmatists have confused two s e ns e s of mean-
ing. "We may say 'that cloud means rain', or we may sa y 
'pluie means rain'. It is obvious that these t wo s e n se s of 
'meaning' are wholly different. 1180 In oth e r words, th e y 
have confused the meaning of (A causes B), with the meaning 
of (A=B). Merely because (A) brings about certain useful 
consequences, does not mean that (A) and those consequences 
are the same. (A), meaning truth, is not the same as its 
consequences. In another passage Russell states that James 
and other pragmatists have confused "criterion" with "mean-
ing." 
Now if pragmatists only affirmed that utility is a 
criterion of truth, there would be much less to be said 
against their view .... The arguments of pragmatists are 
almost wholly directed to proving that utility is a 
criterion; that utility is the meaning of truth is then 
supposed to follow.81 
Russell's point is - that the pragmatist fails to . distinguish 
the conditions that lead us to believe (A) from what it 
means to say that (A) is true. 
James agrees that were there only one "universe of dis-
course"--such as that of logic and mathematics, for 
example--Russell's evaluation would be correct. But in 
point of fact, there are "different universes of dis-




Russe l l , Philosophical Essays, p. 97 
Ibid ., pp. 120 - 121 
James , The Mea n i ng of Truth, pp . 149 - 15 0 
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i s a on the one hand, and "matters of fact," on th e oth e r, 
useful one here. James is willing to grant the abstr a ct 
notion of truth as the agreement of our ideas with r e al i ty: 
"Truth with a big T, and in the singular, clai ms a bstr a c tly 
83 to be recognized, of course;" but where does that alone 
get us? James can not accept that the correspondence theory 
of truth is the "only" theory of truth; neither does he 
believe that the pragmatic theory of truth is the "only" 
theory of truth. They in fact complement one another. If 
correspondence is the only sense of truth that is accept-
able, then the pragmatic theory of truth is only a confused 
theory of meaning. But James maintains there is another 
sense of truth: the pragmatic one. If moral truths, aes-
thetic truths, or religious truths are not to be seen as 
nonsense, there must be a sense in which such as these are 
either pragmatically true or false. It is this condition 
which causes James to remark that "Our account of truth is 
an account of truths in the plural .... 1184 
Russell refuses to allow the above distinction, and 
therefore never gets past the notion that true ideas work. 




Good consequences are not proposed by us merely as a 
sure ~ign, ~ark, or criterion, by which truth's pres-
ence is habitually ascertained, tho they may indeed 
serve on .occasion as such a sign; they are proposed as 
th e lurking motive inside of every truth-cla i m, whet he r 
James , Pr ag mat i sm, p. 102 
Ibid ., p . 9 6 
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the 'trow e r' be conscious of such motive, or whether he 
obey it blindly. They are proposed as the causa exis -
tendi of our beliefs, not as their logical cue or 
premise, and still less as their ~bject~v~ delivera~ce 
or content. They assign the only 1ntell1g1bl e practical 
meaning to that difference in our beliefs which our 
habit of calling them true or false comports. 85 
True ideas work, but not every idea which is seen to work 
is true. Truth does not equal "what works." Truth is the 
agreement of our ideas with reality. True ideas work, and 
the working is the only "practical meaning" whi ch a true 
idea can have. That an idea is seen to work, does not auto-
matically mean that it is true. Initially, it ought only 
indicate that the idea in question is a candidate for fur-
ther testing and evaluation. That an idea is seen to work 
is, thus, only the beginning of the verification process, 
not the end. And finally, that an idea is seen to work does 
not necessitate its becoming the pragmatic community's next 
new standard. 
In contradistinction to Russell, then, the pragmatic 
community does have "standard[s] of truth other than suc-
cess.11 Such standards are the result of 
An experiment of the most searching kind [which] has 
proved that the laws and usages of the land are what 
yield the maximum of satisfaction to the thinkers taken 
all together.86 
The community does not simply create truth as it goes in 
response to whatever situation it finds itself in; and its 
use of the pragmatic method does not force it to change its 
85 
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standards every time a new idea is s ee n to wor k. On the 
other hand, if a rule or law is seen as no long e r work in g, 
it is then reevaluated in light of past, pres e nt, a nd 
future considerations, with possible r e vision or e v e n 
rejection as the next step. That such reevaluations will b e 
this inclusive, and not focus on the "quick fix," can not 
of course be guranteed. But James' vision of the pragmatic 
community as "An experiment of the most searching kind," 




I feel that in the years to come, the greatest impact 
of James' philosophy will be seen to be his work on the 
theory of relations, rather than his pragmatism. I also 
believe that one consequence of this will be a heightened 
appreciation of his social philosophy. This work is a 
reflection of both of these considerations. 
Admittedly, the student of James' social philosophy is, 
for the most part, faced with a project of reconstruction. 
James provides no systematic statement; his remarks on the 
subject are scattered throughout the length and breadth of 
his entire philosophy. One point is abundantly clear: for 
James, the individual, and his or her development, is pri-
mary. The social institution, whatever its constitution or 
size, is secondary and ministerial. We must also realize, 
though, that true development always occurs within a social 
context. 
The central focus of the present work has been to 
ascertain the status of the notion of community in James" 
philosophy. James gives us no 11 theory of community." His 
thoughts on the topic take the form of a description of our 
"experience of community." I see two aspects of this 
description as offering great promise for the further 
e nrichment of this experience. Recent philosophers have 
80 
gr ea tly elaborated the narrative conc e pt of selfhood ; but 
non e to my knowledge have mentioned Jam e s i n th is regard . I 
feel further investigation, when done within th e c ont ext o f 
James' theory of relations, will give new i mpe t us t o o ur 
quest to understand and improve our relations to others a nd 
the community as a whole. I also see James' notion of s ym-
pathy, understood as a process of communication, as another 
way in which real progress can be made in our continuing 
efforts to confront and heal the many traditional ills of 
community life. 
I close with this reflection: James' version of prag-
matism, when understood in its entirety, is not the crude 
power-oriented method - that it has been portrayed as being 
for so long. That James was guilty of being less than rig-
orous in many of his arguments, can not be denied. But the 
many unsavory consequences which the method supposedly of 
necessity leads to, never materialize if we simply remember 
that while everything that is true works, not everything 
which is seen as working is true. And, it is in light of 
this, that the notion of a "pragmatic community" need not 
be looked upon with aversion. 
81 
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